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INTRODUCTION
The Earth is one but the world is not.'
In recent years, the links between international trade, sustainable
development, and the planet's environmental health have occupied a
prominent spot on the international political agenda. The United Nations'
Earth Summit revealed a global consensus that "it is no longer possible
to treat ecology and [the] international political economy as separate
spheres."2 However, this political and ecological truism is not reflected
in contemporary international institutions or practice. The fragmented
nature of the international system has given rise to acute tensions between
the international trade regime, which seeks the general elimination of
barriers to trade, and the international environmental regime, which
1. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
27 (1987) [hereinafter WCED].
2. Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Environment:
An Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (Andrew Hurrell
& Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL POLITICS].
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imposes barriers to trade in environmentally harmful products and
products produced in environmentally harmful ways.
These tensions are particularly pronounced when nations restrict trade
to protect environmental resources located outside their own borders, and
international institutions have increasingly been called upon to resolve
disputes arising out of these types of "green" trade measures. Although
such disputes are, not new,3 the bitter debate over the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the controversial efforts of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to resolve trade-
environment disputes have catapulted these issues to the forefront of the
political debate.
A growing body of literature addresses the substantive issues raised
by the competing demands of these two bodies of international law.
4
However, the institutional questions raised by these issues have not
attracted sufficient scholarly attention. In particular, what type of organi-
zation should consider disputes arising out of the conflicting obligations
imposed by the international trade and international environmental
regimes? In a world of over 180 equal, sovereign nations, what institution
should determine when one country's environmental laws conflict with
international trade obligations or when one nation's trade policies threaten
to undermine international environmental obligations? The purpose of this
article is to offer an analysis that may help to answer these and other
institutional questions.
To date, many of the international conflicts between liberalized trade
and environmental protection have been considered under the auspices of
the GATT. However, this body has no mandate to advance environmental
3. For a brief historical overview of efforts to use trade tools to achieve environmental
objectives, see Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX,
J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 37, 39-41. For an early example of the international tensions
created when nations attempt to protect resources located beyond their borders, see Behring Sea
Fur Seals Arbitration, I MOORE Int'l Arbitration Awards 755-61 (1898) (rejecting U.S. claims
of a unilateral right to stop pelagic sealing in waters beyond national jurisdiction). For a dis-
cussion of this decision, see M.J. Peterson, International Fisheries Management, in INSTITU-
TIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
249, 261-62 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH];
PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
493-95 (1992) [hereinafter BIRNIE & BOYLE].
4. See, e.g., Symposium, Greening the GATT- Resolving Trade & Environment Conflicts,
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 447 (1994); Symposium, Environmental Quality and Free Trade:
Interdependent Goals or Irreconcilable Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219 (1992);
Symposium, Agora: Trade and Environment, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992); Symposium,
Trade and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 387 (1993); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE (1993); Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc.
GATT/1529 (Feb. 3, 1991) (report of the GATT Secretariat) [hereinafter GATT Secretariat
Report].
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interests. Where conflict exists, GATT practice invariably subordinates
environmental interests to trade interests. Trade-environment disputes will
also be considered under the provisions of NAFTA. Innovative provisions
in this agreement attempt to address some of the shortcomings of the
GATT system but still fail to incorporate adequately notions of sustain-
able development. In short, both of these bodies seek increased trade and
growth without mandating ecologically (or even economically) sustainable
development.
Those who seek a more balanced resolution of the competing de-
mands of liberalized trade and global environmental protection have
therefore looked for alternative institutions. Many have suggested that the
International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court), or an International Court
for the Environment, ought to consider such issues. However, nations
have been reluctant to use international tribunals in the past, and the
advocates of adjudication offer little reason to think that global environ-
mental disputes will find their way to international courts more frequently
in the future. As explained more fully below, there are strong political
and policy arguments against submitting such disputes to international
adjudication.
The central thesis of this article is that neither trade bodies, like the
GATT or NAFTA, nor adjudicatory bodies, like the ICJ or the proposed
International Court for the Environment, ought to resolve these issues.
Instead, trade-environment conflicts should be heard before an institution
that recognizes the interdependent nature of global economic and envi-
ronmental issues and that has a mandate to advance both economic
development and environmental protection. This body should have ready
access to the scientific and technical expertise that would enable it to
resolve trade-environment disputes knowledgeably. It should possess tools
to encourage nations to comply with its decisions. Finally, the institution
should be able to look beyond the interests of the parties to a particular
dispute to protect broader interests in the international economy and 'the
global ecosystem.
This article begins by analyzing the handling of trade-environment
conflicts by global and regional trade bodies, such as the GATT and
NAFTA. These bodies subordinate environmental interests to economic
interests, thereby disabling governments from utilizing many of the most
effective tools at their disposal for protecting the global environment. The
article discusses adjudicatory institutions, including the ICJ and the
proposed International Court for the Environment. Through an exploration
of the political, doctrinal, and structural impediments to adjudication of
international environmental disputes, this article explains why so few
1046 [Vol. 15:1043
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global environmental disputes are resolved by international adjudicatory
bodies.
Finally, an alternative mechanism for the resolution of trade-envi-
ronment conflicts is proposed. International environmental disputes,
including conflicts involving international trade issues, are best resolved
in fora that are not adjudicatory. This article outlines several features of
the type of institution that is needed and shows how such an institution
can play an important role in a global partnership for sustainable devel-
opment.
I. THE TRADE INSTITUTIONS
A. The Ancien Rigime: The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade
The GATT is the primary international institution governing interna-
tional trade. Although the GATT has also been the leading international
institution to address trade-environment disputes, it was never intended
to play this role.5 When global environmental concerns come before the
GATT, they are invariably subordinated to the economic and trade
interests that the GATT is designed to serve. As demonstrated below, the
privileging of trade over environmental interests is found in the GATT's
institutional history and mandate; in the results reached by various GATT
dispute resolution proceedings; and in the structure of GATT's dispute
resolution process.
1. Institutional History and Mandate:
The GATT & the Post-War Quest for Growth
During the late 1940s, many U.S. and European political leaders
believed that the trade wars of the 1920s and 1930s, and the resulting
political frictions, contributed to World War II. Toward the end of the
war, a series of initiatives was launched to develop global trade and
monetary organizations that could help avoid future trade wars.6 The 1944
5. "Since 1980, the GATT dispute settlement procedures seem to have been used for the
settlement of international disputes over national environmental measures more frequently than
the dispute settlement procedures of any other worldwide organization." Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environmental Law: Prevention and
Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in GAT, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1993, at
53.
6. Many trace the origins of the GATT to discussions between the United States, the U.K.,
and Canada in 1942 about provisions of the Lend-Lease program and the postwar economy.
See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 7-8
(1975); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2411, Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and
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Bretton Woods Conference, convened by the Western allies, produced
draft charters for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund7 and
a call for an international agreement to "reduce obstacles to international
trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international
commercial relations."8 Shortly thereafter, a multilateral agreement was
reached on a series of tariff reductions. This agreement was memorialized
in a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (General Agreement), which
was intended to be subsumed for a charter for the proposed International
Trade Organization (ITO). 9 The ITO was to be the body that governed the
international trading order. However, the diplomats who negotiated the
General Agreement were eager to bring it into force as quickly as
possible, even though the ITO negotiations had not been completed. '0 The
parties to the General Agreement therefore entered into a Protocol of
Provisional Application, through which the General Agreement would be
applied until the entire ITO Charter came into force.
Employment (1945) (setting out a detailed "Proposal for Consideration by an International
Conference on Trade and Employment").
U.S. policy was driven by several concerns. Policymakers were convinced that interna-
tional efforts to liberalize trade and regulate international monetary flow were essential to
promoting international political harmony. As one Presidential message stated:
'The fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against each other for
wealth and power, or work together for security and mutual advantage .... The
experience of cooperation in the task of earning a living promotes both the habit and
the techniques of common effort and helps make permanent the mutual confidence
on which the peace depends.'
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 10 (1989).
Earlier, the U.S. Congress had passed legislation enabling the President to negotiate
mutual tariff reductions; however, negotiations of bilateral agreements were lengthy and their
efficacy limited. Thus, a multilateral approach was sought. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J.
DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 294 (2d ed. 1986).
7. A concise survey of the history and evolving objectives of these institutions can be
found in The IMF and the World Bank, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991 (special survey
section).
8. Quoted in JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 40 (1969); see
also John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 15 (1992). Trade was not directly addressed at Bretton Woods, because the Confer-
ence was held under the jurisdiction .of the ministries of finance, which were not responsible
for international trade. Id. at 16.
9. In the text that follows, the term "General Agreement" refers to the text of the General
Agreement itself (including subsequent changes). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
The term "GATT" refers to the GATT trading system as an institution and as a regime
including the General Agreement and subsequent side agreements. The "contracting parties"
are the signatory members of the General Agreement.
10. The tariff concessions could not remain secret for very long. A prolonged wait before
these concessions came into force would have seriously disrupted international trade patterns.
JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE'GATT SYSTEM 13 (1990).
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However, the ITO Charter never entered into force, leaving a major
gap in the institutional framework designed to govern international
economic affairs." By default, the GATT became the principal mecha-
nism governing international trade. 12 Today, over 100 nations are GATT
members, and approximately twenty-eight apply the GATT on a de facto
basis.13
The General Agreement imposes four principal substantive obligations
on its contracting parties. First, each party may levy no more than a
stated tariff on particular products imported from other GATT contracting
parties. As a result of several "rounds" of negotiations held under GATT
auspices, the average tariff on industrial goods has declined by ninety
percent in the last forty years.'
4
Second, each contracting party is required to grant to every other con-
tracting party treatment at least as favorable as it grants any other nation
with respect to the import or export of like products. This "most-favored-
nation principle" has long been a cornerstone of international trade law. 5
Under this principle, a GATT party is precluded from granting special
1I. By the time the ITO draft charter was completed in early 1948, "the aura of interna-
tional cooperation that prevailed immediately after World War II had faded, and the composi-
tion of [the U.S.] Congress had shifted to a stance less liberal on trade matters and less
internationally oriented." JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 6, at 295. When the United States
refused to join the ITO, it became clear that the ITO would never come into being. Id.
The ITO Charter is described in detail in CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE
(1949); George Bronz, The International Trade Organization Charter, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1949).
12. See generally John. H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1967).
13. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE POLICY 69 (1992). At present, requests for admission have been received from Albania,
Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Honduras, Latvia, Moldova,
Mongolia, Nepal, Panama, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. GATT
Receives Membership Applications From Armenia, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) (Dec. 20, 1993).
Approximately ninety percent of world trade is conducted pursuant to the rules of the
GATT. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra; A Note on the GATT, in TRADE POLICIES
FOR A BETTER FUTURE: THE "LEUTWEILER REPORT," THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND
67 (Peter Erenhaft ed., 1987).
14. Susan F. Rasky, Groping for a New Order on Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1987, § 3,
at 1. The negotiating rounds included the original drafting session in Geneva, Switzerland; a
1949 round in Annecy, France; a 1950 round in Torquay, England; a 1956 round in Geneva;
a 1960-61 round in Geneva (the Dillon Round); a 1963-67 round in Geneva (the Kennedy
Round); a 1973-79 round in Geneva (the Tokyo Round); and the recently concluded Uruguay
Round. A history of the first five rounds is found in GERARD CURZON, MULTILATERAL COM-
MERCIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLITICS AND TECHNIQUES (1965).
15. The most-favored-nation clause in trade agreements dates back to the twelfth century.
See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93RD CONG., 2D SESS., THE MOST-FAVORED-
NATION CLAUSE PROVISION, EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDY No. 9 (Comm. Print 1974).
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trading advantages to particular nations and from discriminating among
trading partners.
Third, GATT signatories are to extend "national treatment" to like
products from other contracting parties, meaning that "imported goods
will be accorded the same treatment as goods of local origin with respect
to matters under government control, such as taxation and regulation. 16
The purpose of this provision is to preclude discrimination between
products that are domestically produced and similar products produced in
other nations.
Finally, the General Agreement generally prohibits the use of non-
pecuniary restrictions on imports or exports. 17 Under this provision,
nations are not to maintain quotas, embargoes, or other "quantitative"
restrictions on goods from other contracting parties. These substantive
obligations further the GATT's principal purpose: "the substantial reduc-
tion of tariffs and other barriers to trade and ... the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce."'
18
Review of the preparatory conferences and drafting history reveals
little concern over the relationship between international trade and global
ecology. There is likewise little evidence that any of the GATT's provi-
sions were drafted to advance global environmental interests. This is not
surprising, since at the time there was little governmental knowledge of,
or interest in, domestic or international environmental issues. 9 There were
relatively few domestic environmental laws or agencies and even fewer
organizations concerned with global environmental issues. Many of the
concerns that animate contemporary international environmental law
16. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 8, at 273.
17. The General Agreement provides that "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than
duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas . . . or other measures,
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of
the territory of any other contracting party." GATT, supra note 9, at art. XI, § 1. There are
several exceptions to this general prohibition. The most important exceptions concern agricul-
tural products, id., at art. XII, § 2(c); measures to safeguard a nation's balance of payments,
id., at arts. XII, XVII, § 4(a); and certain exceptions available to developing nations. Id., at art.
18, § 4(a).
18. Id., at pmbl.
19. See STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE
ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 74 (1992) ("It is hardly surprising that GATT does
not deal effectively with environment or sustainable development issues, as neither was an
international concern when it was set up."); Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as
Partners in Sustainable Development: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 728 (1992) ("In
the immediate postwar period, countries were not concerned with the environment, because they
had not yet recognized their capacity to degrade it irreversibly .... ). But see Charnovitz, supra
note 3 (explaining that there were discussions regarding international fishery and wildlife




either did not exist or were not perceived to be major issues. As a result,
the GATT lacks any institutional mandate to advance global environmen-
tal interests.
2. GATT Practice: The Subordination of Environmental Interests
Over the years, several GATT dispute resolution panels have consid-
ered whether trade restrictions designed to further environmental ends
conflict with the obligations set out in the General Agreement. As a
general rule, the central question presented in these cases is whether the
trade restriction falls within the scope of GATT Article XX.20 This article
permits trade restrictions that are "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health," or "relat[e] to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources." 21 A "the original drafters in 1947 did not intend the Article to
cover environmental protection which was not then an issue .. .[the]
strained arguments ... made to include particular environmental policy
measures under the exceptions" have generally been unsuccessful.22
20. Although the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade was designed to minimize the
trade distortions caused by divergent national standards for agricultural and industrial products,
and includes dispute resolution procedures, to date there has been no formal resolution of a
dispute under this Agreement. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Apr. 12, 1979, 31
U.S.T. 405, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276.
21. This article provides, in relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption ....
GATT, supra note 9, at art. XX.
22. Eliza Patterson, GATT and the Environment: Rules Changes to Minimize Adverse
Trade and Environmental Effects, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1992, at 99, 107.
See, e.g., GATT, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Aug. 16, 1991), 30
I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report]; GATT, Thailand-Restrictions
on Importation and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, BASIC INSTRUMENTS SELECTED DOCUMENTS
[hereinafter B.I.S.D.] 200 (37th Supp. 1990) (cigarette import restrictions designed to protect
human health impermissibly discriminate between domestic and imported products) [hereinafter
Thai Cigarette Case]; GATT, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, B.I.S.D. 98 (35th Supp. 1989) (natural resources export restrictions are not
primarily aimed at conservation and impermissibly discriminate against foreign markets);
GATT, United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,
B.I.S.D. 91 (29th Supp. 1983) (import restrictions on fish violate GATT in light of disparate
treatment of domestic production and consumption).
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Indeed, as explained more fully below, successive GATT dispute
resolution panels have developed an increasingly restrictive interpretation
of the Article XX exception.23 Under this narrow interpretation, the
GATT generally does not permit the use of trade measures to protect
global commons resources. The GATT likewise does not permit nations
to restrict trade in goods produced in environmentally destructive ways.
In addition, the use of unfair trade statutes to counter lax environmental
regulations in other nations appears to be inconsistent with the GATT.
Finally, under GATT practice, even where trade measures are not pro-
hibited, their use is seriously constrained.
a. The GATT Severely Restricts the Use of Trade Measures
Designed to Protect the Global Commons
Collective action to protect global commons resources is one of the
most prominent trends in international environmental law.25 The global
community has 'engaged in extensive efforts to protect the atmosphere,26
the high seas, 27 Antarctica, 28 and other areas or resources that are outside
Similar results have been reached under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
See United States-Canada Binational Panel, In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement
for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Panel No. CDA 89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989) (require-
ment that fish caught in Canadian waters be "landed" in Canada is impermissible in light of
less restrictive alternatives).
23. Although the GATT system does not have a doctrine of legally binding precedents,
as a general matter dispute resolution panels cite to, and reason by analogy from, past panel
reports. See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1273 (1992).
24. For a useful description of the different types of environmental trade measures nations
might use, see Steve Charnovitz, A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures, 6 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1993).
25. This author has argued elsewhere that customary international environmental law
contains a duty not to harm the global commons. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International
Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1407, 1433-38 (1992).
26. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, at art. 9, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]; Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985),
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Adjustments and Amend-
ments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 537 [hereinafter London Amendments].
27. See, e.g., International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation, Nov. 30, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733 (1991); United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (not
in force); Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South
Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987).
28. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455.
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the jurisdiction of any nation or group of nations. Approximately seventy
percent of the earth's surface is either commons or not yet subject to
undisputed sovereign control.2 9
A recent GATT dispute resolution panel report concluded that the
GATT severely restricts the use of environmental trade measures to
protect global commons resources. 30 This report arose out of a Mexican
challenge to certain provisions of the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA). The MMPA prohibits the importation of fish caught in a
manner that incidentally kills marine mammals in excess of U.S. stan-
dards. 31 The United States had imposed an embargo on yellowfin tuna
and tuna products caught by Mexican vessels. The United States argued
to a GATT dispute resolution panel that this ban fell within the scope of
Article XX(b)'s exception for trade restrictions "necessary ... to protect
animal life, safety or health." This argument was rejected for several
independent reasons. First, the Panel's cursory review of Article XX's
drafting history led it to the conclusion that "the drafters of Article XX(b)
focused on the use of sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of
humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing coun-
try. 32 Thus, the Panel determined that Article XX(b) can only be invoked
for trade measures that protect resources located within the jurisdiction
of the sanctioning nation. Second, the Panel concluded that the U.S.
measure was not "necessary" to protect animal life, safety, or health.33
29. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 35 (1993).
30. Since the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report was issued when environmental concerns were
threatening Congressional ratification of NAFTA, Mexico never requested that the report be
considered by the full GATT Council. Thus, the report has not been formally adopted by the
Council and technically has no precedential value. However, the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report
has set the framework for much of the scholarly and political debates over trade-environment
issues.
31. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988) [hereinafter MMPA].
The provision states, in relevant part, that "[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the
importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have been caught with commercial
fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean
mammals in excess of United States standards." Id.
32. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 22, at para. 5.26 (emphasis added). An earlier
draft of this clause permitted trade restrictions "[flor the purpose of protecting human, animal
or plant life or health, if corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in
the importing country." Id. (emphasis added). According to the Panel, this highlighted clause
addressed concerns that importing nations might abuse sanitary regulations for protectionist
purposes. The clause was later dropped as unnecessary. From this scant history, the Panel
concluded that the drafters were concerned about the use of sanitary measures to safeguard
resources inside the importing country. Id.
33. The Panel reached this conclusion for two independent reasons. First, according to the
Panel, the United States had not demonstrated that it had attempted to negotiate an international
agreement to protect dolphins. Id., at para. 5.28. However, this reasoning is suspect; nothing
in Article XX requires a nation to pursue international negotiations before enacting domestic
legislation. Moreover, as a factual matter, the Panel's assertion that the United States had not
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Finally, the Panel reasoned that if this environmental trade measure were
permitted, "each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or
health protection policies from which other contracting parties could not
deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement."
The Panel evidently believed that such a "broad" interpretation would
permit (or, perhaps, invite) any number of environmental trade measures
and thereby undermine the liberalized trade regime that the GATT
created. Eager to avoid such a result, the Panel concluded that Article
XX(b) does not permit nations to restrict trade to protect global commons
resources.
This rationale endangers critical provisions of treaties and laws
35
designed to protect the earth's atmosphere, wildlife, and other global
commons resources. 36 As global commons resources belong to no single
nation, each country has little incentive to restrict its use of such
resources. 37 Thus, overexploitation of these resources can typically only
engaged in multilateral efforts to address the Tuna-Dolphin problem is simply incorrect.
Through the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the United States has been
involved in ongoing attempts to address this issue. For example, in 1990, the United States
proposed that the IATTC adopt international marine mammal quotas that would be progressive-
ly reduced to levels approaching zero.
The Panel also concluded that the MMPA was written in such a way that "the Mexican
authorities could not know whether, at a given point in time, their policies conformed to the
United States' dolphin protection standards" and could not adjust their conduct accordingly. Id.
The Panel asserted that a restriction "based on such unpredictable conditions" was not
"necessary" for purposes of Article XX(b). Id. Again, the Panel's rationale is not persuasive.
Whether the permissible taking rate for foreign fleets is "unpredictable" does not answer the
question of whether it is "necessary." Significantly, neither Mexico nor the Panel suggested an
alternative measure reasonably available to the United States that would effectively serve the
MMPA's conservationist purposes.
34. Id. at 5.27. The United States also argued that the tuna ban fell within the scope of
Article XX(g). Relying on similar "unpredictability" and "slippery slope" arguments, the Panel
limited the reach of this provision to trade measures designed to protect environmental interests
within the jurisdiction of the sanctioning state. Id., at paras. 5.30-5.34.
35. In addition to the MMPA, the rationale employed by the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report
threatens provisions of the Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988) (trade sanctions against nations that diminish
the effectiveness of the Whaling Convention); the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988) (trade sanctions against nations that diminish the
effectiveness of international fishery conservation programs); the African Elephant Conservation
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4201 et. seq. (1988) (prohibiting ivory imports from nations with inadequate
elephant protection programs); and the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et. seq.,
§ 1538 (1973) (prohibiting trade in endangered species).
36. It also threatens to eliminate one of the few available policy tools that can effectively
protect global commons resources. Less coercive diplomatic measures are often insufficient to
persuade nations to change their environmental practices. Conversely, nations are reluctant to
employ more coercive measures, such as the threat or use of force, against another nation in
response to improper trade in an endangered plant or excessive use of an ozone depleting
chemical.
37. This is an international example of the "tragedy of the commons." See Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
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be prevented by multilateral action. However, multilateral efforts give rise
to a series of familiar "collective action" problems.38 Trade measures are
used to address many of these collective action problems.
For example, nations that act to preserve global commons resources
pursuant to international agreement create a "public good" from which
they cannot exclude other nations. Imposing trade restraints against "free
riders," nations that are not part of the agreement, is one way of mini-
mizing or eliminating the benefits enjoyed by nonparties, thereby en-
couraging the nonparties to participate in international environmental
efforts.39
In addition, in many circumstances, collective action by a group of
states may be rendered ineffective if other nations do not cooperate. For
example, the efforts of a nation or group of nations to reduce the use of
ozone depleting substances can be rendered ineffective if these reductions
are in effect replaced by increased use of these substances by other
nations. 40 Trade measures can encourage reluctant states to join interna-
tional environmental efforts and thus increase the possibility that these
efforts will be successful.4'
Trade measures also address competitiveness concerns that may arise
from the imposition of environmental obligations. Industries often urge
governments not to sign treaties or enact legislation that imposes environ-
mental costs on the grounds that they will be placed at a competitive
disadvantage vis-A-vis their competitors in other nations that have not
assumed the same obligations. 4' Trade measures against nations that are
38. Collective action problems arise when individual parties can, without taking any action,
enjoy the benefits created by the collective efforts of other parties. See generally MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d
ed. 1971); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
39. See generally Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses
and Strategies, 38 WORLD POL. 1 (1985) (sanctions against nonmembers or violators is
essential to deter free riders and maintain a regime). A good example of this phenomena is the
case of South Korea which acceded to the Montreal Protocol the day before trade sanctions
were to be imposed. See Sang Don Lee, The Effect of Environmental Regulations on Trade:
Cases of Korea's New Environmental Laws, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 651, 657 (1993).
40. See, e.g., Three Year, $510 Million Budget Approved At Montreal Protocol Meeting,
Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 18, 1993) (in 1991, industrialized nations decreased their
consumption of ozone depleting substances by an average of 45% but developing nations
increased their consumption by 54%).
41. Again, the South Korean example is instructive. South Korea decided to honor the
International Whaling Commission's moratorium on whaling in response to a U.S. threat to
prohibit South Korean fishing operations in the U.S. exclusive economic zone and to ban
imports of South Korean fish products. See Lee, supra note 39, at 659.
42. On the other hand, industries operating under strict domestic regulation may urge their
governments to enter into international agreements. For example, in the ozone depletion
context, at one time U.S. industry was subject to certain restraints that their competitors in the
European Community (EC) did not face. The U.S. industry's demand for a "level playing field"
vis-i,-vis their EC competitors strongly influenced this nation's international negotiating
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not undertaking environmental efforts can eliminate any comparative
advantage and encourage recalcitrant states to enact heightened environ-
mental standards.
Finally, a nation may properly decide that it does not wish to aid and
abet the harmful environmental practices of other nations. The Tuna-
Dolphin Panel Report rationale would obligate nations to provide markets
for products that contribute to the destruction of global commons resourc-
es, arguably forcing states to violate their responsibility under internation-
al environmental'law to ensure that "activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment ... beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. 43 For all these reasons, the GATT's restriction on
trade measures designed to protect global commons resources presents an
position. See, e.g., RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFE-
GUARDING THE PLANET 30-34 (1991).
Whether environmental regulations in fact create such competitive disadvantages is hotly
debated. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: COMPETITIVE CHALLENGES AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES (1994); Richard B.
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039
(1993) (reviewing empirical studies of the relationships between environmental measures and
international competitiveness); Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Environment and World Trade, 23
ENVTL. L. 687 (1993) (U.S. leadership in environmental regulations can promote, rather than
restrict, U.S. international competitiveness).
43. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Prin. 2, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; Declara-
tion of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Prin. 21, June 16, 1972,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.I, reprinted in I I I.L.M. 1416, 1420 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
Just prior to publication, a GATT dispute resolution panel released a report on an EC
challenge to a tuna embargo imposed by the United States under the MMPA. United
States-Restrictions on Import of Tuna: Report of the Panel, DS29/R, Limited Distribution,
June 1994 [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report II]. Again, the Panel found that the U.S.
tuna embargo was not justified under any Article XX exceptions. However, in a potentially
significant departure from the first Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, Tuna Dolphin Panel Report II
adopted a broader reading of Article XX. In particular, the Panel found that Article XX
exceptions are not limited to trade measures designed to protect resources located within the
nation relying on Article XX. Id., at paras. 5.20, 5.33.
Nevertheless, the U.S. tuna embargo was deemed GATT inconsistent, because it was
designed to pressure other nations to change their fishing practices. The Panel stated that if
"Article XX were to be interpreted to permit [nations] to take trade measures so far as to force
other contracting parties to change their [environmental] policies ... the General Agreement
could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among [nations]." Id., at para. 5.26.
See also Dunoff, supra note 25, at 1420-21 (criticizing similar "slippery slope" arguments in
the first Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report). Apparently the Panel was concerned that each sovereign
nation have the right to set its own environmental policies. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report II,
supra, at paras. 5.26, 5.38.
The GATT's commitment to this version of state sovereignty renders it unable to evaluate
appropriately trade measures designed to protect the global commons resources. See Jeffrey L.
Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading Institutions, 27
CORNELL J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1994). The Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report II's commitment to
state sovereignty largely eviscerates the potential benefits that could have flowed from its
expansive reading of Article XX. Since a significant number of environmental trade measures
are designed, at least in part, to encourage other nations to change their practices, these
measures, under the Panel's reasoning, would not fall within the scope of Article XX excep-
tions.
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extremely serious handicap to the international community's efforts to
protect these resources.
b. The GATT Does Not Permit Trade Restrictions on Products
Produced in an Environmentally Destructive Manner
An increasing number of environmental regulations are aimed not at
regulating products as such, but rather the process by which products are
produced. 44 The regulation at issue in the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report is
an example of a process-based standard. The U.S. import ban was not
directed at tuna qua tuna, but rather at the method by which the tuna
were caught. Process-based trade restrictions are increasingly designed to
protect resources located beyond national borders. For example, Austria
is considering a ban on the import of tropical timber harvested in an
unsustainable manner.45 Similarly, a number of nations ban the importa-
tion of fish caught in the high seas by use of driftnets.46
Under the GATT, importing nations cannot discriminate between
"like" domestic and foreign products or between "like" products from
different trading partners. According to the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report,
any differential treatment must be based on measures "affecting products
as such. '47 Under this rationale, goods produced using, "clean" production
technologies are "like" goods produced using "dirty" technologies. 4 Thus,
"it is not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's own
market dependent on the domestic environmental policies or practices of
44. See, e.g, Charnovitz, supra note 24, at 13-15; William J. Snape & Naomi Lefkovitz,
Searching for the GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting Due
Process, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1994). The use of process based standards is not
an entirely new phenomena. For example, at the turn of the century, the United States
prohibited the importation of sponges taken by means of diving or diving apparatus: Act of
June 20, 1906, ch. 3442, 34 Stat. 313 (regulating sale of sponges).
45. Earlier legislation increased the import tax on products containing tropical wood and
required that all tropical timber and products containing tropical timber be labelled as such to
distinguish them from a quality mark related to sustainable forest management. FEDERAL
GAZETTE (Rep. of Austria), 184th ed., Aug. 31, 1992. In response, Malaysia submitted a protest
to the GATT Council on behalf of the ASEAN nations.
46. See Large Scale Pelagic Drift-net Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/46/215 (1992); Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the
South Pacific, Nov. 24, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1449; High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(E) (Supp. 1992) (requiring Secretary of Treasury to impose trade
sanctions on nations that engage in driftnet fishing).
47. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 22, at para. 5.11 (emphasis added).
48. Applying this principle, the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report stated that the MMPA import
ban did not affect tuna as a product since there was no difference between the product
(yellowfin tuna) caught by Mexican and U.S. vessels. Id., at para. 5.14. The Panel's reasoning
on this point is examined more fully in Dunoff, supra note 25, at 1413-15.
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the exporting country."49 A nation may not restrict imports of a product
because the product was produced in an environmentally harmful man-
ner.
50
Permitting the regulation of products but prohibiting the regulation
of processes makes little environmental sense. "[F]rom the viewpoint of
environmentally sustainable development, the process by which products
are made is as important as the product."'" The use, for example, of
ozone depleting chemicals in the manufacturing process for electronic
circuits can be as harmful to the earth's atmosphere as the use of an
identical amount of such chemicals in a cooling unit. To limit the ability
to restrict trade in products produced by environmentally destructive
practices is to eliminate an essential measure for achieving sustainable
development.5 z
c. The GATT Forbids the Use of Unfair Trade Statutes to Address
International Environmental Issues
The next generation of conflicts between the trade and environmental
regimes will arise when nations attempt to utilize their "unfair trade" laws
to address the allegedly inadequate environmental practices of other
nations.53 Unfair trade laws typically come in two varieties: subsidies and
antidumping statutes. Both are subject to GATT disciplines.
Subsidies are grants or bounties that governments bestow, directly or
indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchan-
dise. Some environmentalists argue that a government's failure to impose
sufficiently strong environmental regulations on a particular industry
constitutes a government subsidy to that industry. In effect, the
49. GATT Secretariat Report, supra note 4, at 10.
50. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 22, at paras. 5.14-5.15; GATT Secretariat
Report, supra note 4, at 7; Richard B. Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental
Protection, 27 INT'L LAW. 751, 756 (1993).
51. Weiss, supra note 19, at 730.
52. Id. See also Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1386-87 (1992) (arguing that "countries must be allowed to
ensure that the full life cycle of imported products (from cradle to grave) meets the standards
applicable to similar domestic goods").
The product/process distinction can also be criticized on economic grounds. As Steve
Charnovitz has noted, this rule discourages a more efficient economic tool, a direct tax on the
environmental externality (i.e., the amount of pollutant emitted during the production process),
in favor of an indirect and therefore less efficient tax on the product itself. Steve Charnovitz,
Achieving Environmental Goals Under International Rules, 2 REV. EUR. COMM. & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 45, 46 (1993).
53. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 1246 ("[Tlhe subsidies question in relation to environ-
mental policies may be one of the most intricate and difficult issues facing the world trading
system during the next decade.").
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unregulated or loosely regulated use of clean air, water, or other natural
resources can "improperly" become a basis for a particular product's
comparative advantage to the detriment of competitors in other nations
and the "subsidized" environmental resource. Some argue that this
externalization of pollution costs distorts a producer's true costs and that
countervailing duties ought to be utilized in such situations.
54
Adopting this general argument, several legislative proposals have
been introduced in this nation that would treat another nation's failure to
adopt or enforce environmental standards comparable to U.S. standards
as a countervailable subsidy.55 For example, the proposed International
Pollution Deterrence Act 56 would treat other nations' inadequate pollution
controls and environmental safeguards as a government subsidy. The bill
would authorize the imposition of countervailing duties in an amount
equivalent to the cost the foreign firm would have to undertake to comply
with relevant U.S. standards.
The use of countervailing duties in response to another nation's
allegedly lax environmental practices would most likely violate the
GATT.55 A duty levied on the basis of a product's country of origin
would violate the GATT's most-favored-nation clause which requires
54. See, e.g., AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 343 (1992); Robert F Housman &
Durwood Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing: Forging
Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENVTL. L. 545, 550-61 (1993); Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr.,
Recognizing and Countervailing Environmental Subsidies, 26 INT'L LAW. 763 (1992); John A.
Ragosta, Natural Resource Subsidies and the Free Trade Agreement: Economic Justice and the
Need for Subsidy Discipline, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 255 (1990); Kenneth S.
Komoroski, The Failure of Governments to Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under the GATT?,
10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189 (1988); Michael Prieur, Environmental Regulations and Foreign
Trade Aspects, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 85 (1987).
55. A variant on this idea is to impose trade sanctions when a nation fails to enforce its
own environmental laws. See Gephardt Plans Bill to Allow Sanctions for Failure to Enforce
Environmental Laws, Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 25, 1994) (House Majority Leader
announces plans to introduce a "Green 301").
56. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
57. Half of the funds collected under this bill would be earmarked for use by the Agency
for International Development to assist buyers from developing nation with the purchase of
U.S. pollution control equipment.
Similarly, the proposed Global Clean Water Incentives Act would require the imposition
of fees on foreign products manufactured by processes that fail to meet U.S. Clean Water Act
standards. S. 1965, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Funds raised under this bill would be used
to assist the export of U.S. products bearing higher prices as a result of the manufacturer's
compliance with the Clean Water Act.
58. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment:
Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 66 (1992), Housman & Zaelke,
supra note 54, at 560-61; Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized
Countries: International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 859, 895 n.91 (1972); EC Commissioner Urges Trade Policy to Promote Sustainable
Development, Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 15, 1993).
1059Summer 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
uniform treatment of "like products" imported from all GATT contracting
parties.59
From the GATT perspective, there are additional difficulties with this
proposal. GATT subsidies rules focus on government action - the giving
of funds or other grants to particular industries. It would thus take a
significant conceptual leap to define government inaction as constituting
a subsidy.6° Indeed, such a conclusion might imply that nations are
subject to an affirmative duty to protect the environment.6' While many
nations may well acknowledge the existence of such a duty, no consensus
exists on the nature and scope of this duty.62
Moreover, there are important practical difficulties with such a
proposal. How can the importing nation identify the "proper" level of
environmental protection that the exporting nation should have adopted
63
or quantify the alleged benefit bestowed by government inaction?'
A recent GATT Secretariat report argues strongly against the use of
environmental countervailing duties. The report states that:
in principle there is no difference between the competitive impli-
cations of the type raised by different environmental standards and
the competitive consequences of many other policy differences
between countries. Differences between countries in tax and other
policies toward savings and investment affect the capital stock,
which means that countries encouraging capital formation may be
enhancing their competitive advantage in capital-intensive industries.
Large expenditures on education and immigration policies which
selectively encourage the immigration of skilled labour, will
59. This also follows from the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report's dicta that differences in the
environmental laws of exporting nations cannot be the basis for differential treatment if there
are no resulting differences in the imported products themselves. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report,
supra note 22, paras. 5.14-5.15; Kirgis, supra note 58, at 891 ("[a]ny argument to the effect
that pollution-engendering and pollution-free imports are not 'like products' for most-favored-
nation purposes is unpersuasive").
60. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 54, at 556; Komoroski, supra note 54, at 209.
61. Janet MacDonald, Greening the GATT Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental
Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 429 (1993).
62. Id.
63. As Richard Stewart recently noted, there are a number of reasons why nations might
have different environmental standards including differing assimilative capacities. Stewart,
supra note 42, at 2052-56.
64. Countervailing "environmental subsidies" present other difficulties as well. For
example, it is not clear whether the harm caused by lax environmental standards constitutes the
requisite "injury" for GATT purposes. Housman & Zaelke, supra note 54, at 556. The
Subsidies Code defines "injury" in terms of material economic injury to particular domestic
industries. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the




encourage competitive advantage in skill-intensive industries....
The extent of government support for science education can influ-
ence competitive advantage in high-tech industries.
The list is almost endless. Where is the line to be drawn if the
competitive implications of differences in so many government
policies are to become a source of demands for the neutralization of
the consequences for trade?
65
Given all of these reasons, it is extremely unlikely that the GATT
would endorse the use of countervailing duties to address the environ-
mental practices in other nations.
For many of the same reasons, the use of environmental antidumping
duties would likely violate the GATT. Dumping occurs when products
from one nation are sold in another nation at less than fair market value.
66
If this practice causes or threatens material harm to a domestic industry
or retards the establishment of a domestic industry, then the importing
nation may impose antidumping duties on the imported product.
A state with lax environmental standards can export goods at a price
that does not reflect the product's full social cost. The good can then be
sold at less than fair market value.67 Some environmentalists argue that
this should be considered "ecodumping" and that these goods should be
subject to duties.68
From the GATT perspective, the notion of ecodumping raises many
of the same conceptual and definitional problems as does the concept of
government inaction as an environmental subsidy. In addition,
antidumping statutes typically focus on the conduct of private actors; in
65. GATT Secretariat Report, supra note 4, at 20. A GATT study conducted in 1971
similarly concluded that lower product prices resulting from the absence of environmental
regulations is a form of competitive advantage and is not an "unfair" trade practice. Interna-
tional Pollution Control and International Trade, GATT STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
No. 1, at 23 (1971).
Of course, unlike the other policies mentioned by the Secretariat, the lack of environ-
mental regulations can have serious adverse spillover effects, such as when loosely regulated
industrial processes produce transborder or global environmental degradation.
66. The classic discussion of dumping is found in JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923).
67. The concept of ecodumping is explained in more detail in Stewart, supra note 42, at
2049 n.48. See also Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global
Environment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 217 (1994).
68. The use of unfair trade statutes in this manner is not purely theoretical. For example,
a German firm that produced asbestos in compliance with relatively costly German standards
sued an importer of asbestos from a developing nation with a much lower safety standard under
the German Unfair Competition Law. Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law,
198 RECUEIL DES COURs 21, 137 (1986).
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contrast, the problem in the ecodumping context is that the State fails to
enact or enforce adequate environmental regulations. It is unlikely that
duties designed to counter ecodumping would be found to be consistent
with the GATT.
d. The GATT Severely Constrains a Nation's Ability to Utilize Trade
Policy as a Tool for Environmental Protection
In addition to forbidding outright many types of environmental trade
measures, the GATT severely restricts the use of even those measures that
are permitted. This result is achieved through a very narrow interpretation
of the Article XX requirement that trade restrictions be "necessary" for
the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health.
The meaning of this term was at issue in a GATT challenge by the
United States to Thailand's restrictions on imported cigarettes. 69 Although
the law at issue had strong protectionist elements, the reasoning used by
the Thai Cigarette Panel may threaten measures not designed to protect
domestic industries. Transplanting a definition from a different GATT
provision, the Panel declared that a measure is "necessary" only "if an
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it."
70
Applying this test, the Panel concluded that Thailand's restrictions on
imported cigarettes did not fall within the scope of the Article XX
exception. The Panel reasoned that, although cigarette smoking produced
adverse health effects, 7' Thailand's restrictions on imported cigarettes
were not necessary because the government could protect its citizens by
other, less trade restrictive measures. 72 Thus, the Panel suggested, Thai-
land could safeguard the health of its citizens through the use of labeling
requirements 73 and reducing the demand for cigarettes by banning ciga-
rette advertisements.74
69. Thai Cigarette Case, supra note 22, passim. For an interesting background on this
dispute, and on U.S. efforts to open Asian markets to cigarette exports generally, see Stan
Sesser, Opium War Redux, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 13, 1993, at 78, 85.
70. Thai Cigarette Case, supra note 22, para. 74 (quoting Report of the Panel on "United
States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930" (L/6439, para. 5.26, adopted on 7 Nov. 1989)).
71. Id., para. 73. Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between the parties and
a petition by Thailand, the Panel requested information from the World Health Organization
(WHO) regarding the health effects of cigarette use and consumption. The WHO submission
outlined many of the health problems associated with smoking; the U.S. did not "take issue
with [the WHO's] statements regarding the effect of cigarette use and consumption." Id., paras.
3, 5, 50-57.
72. Id., paras. 77-79.
73. Id., para. 77.
74. Id., para. 78. After the decision, Thailand removed its import ban but retained its
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As the Thai Cigarette and Tuna-Dolphin cases demonstrate, in
practice it is almost impossible to meet the requirement that a trade
measure be the least GATT inconsistent remedy reasonably available. 75
Astonishingly, no GATT Panel has required that the proposed alternative
measure be as effective as the measure actually employed. Creative
counsel challenging trade measures should always be able to posit an ex
post facto measure that is less restrictive on trade.
Labeling requirements appear to be one of the few types of envi-
ronmental trade measures that GATT panels will deem "necessary. 76
There is a certain logic to this result from the trade perspective: "green"
trade bans, taxes, quotas, and the like are government actions that
"distort" trade, while labeling schemes permit the market and individual
consumers rather than government bureaucrats to decide whether trade in
environmentally harmful products will occur. Of course, this rationale
ignores the fact that one or more nations may legitimately reach a
political decision that certain markets should not exist. The narrow
reading of Article XX's "necessary" requirement limits significantly the
ability of the community of nations to make such political decisions.
3. GATT Dispute Resolution: A Flawed Process
The GATT's dispute resolution processes reinforce the tendency to
subordinate environmental considerations to trade interests. Since the
GATT was never intended to be the primary international institution with
respect to world trade,77 the GATT itself lacks a well-developed
mechanism for resolving disputes between the Contracting Parties.78 In
health warnings and its ban on advertising and promotional activities. Pornpimol Kanchanalak,
GATT Rules Against Thai Ban on Foreign Cigarettes, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 1, 1990, at 1; Peter
Mytri Ungphakorn, U.S. Won't Object to Cigarette Ban, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 11, 1990, at 1.
75. The current EC challenge to U.S. fuel economy standards may turn, as well, on the
argument that the United States could have used a less restrictive trade measure. See European
Challenge to U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax Could Set Precedent Against Product Bans, Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 10, 1993) [hereinafter European Challenge].
76. In addition to the suggestion that Thailand should have used a labeling scheme, the
Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report upheld the Dolphin Conservation & Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1385 (1990), which regulates the use of the term "dolphin safe" and prohibits the use of this
term on cans of tuna harvested in certain manners. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 22,
paras. 5.41-5.44.
77. The GATT, therefore, lacks several of the features typically associated with an
international organization. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 6, at 5; JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 6, at 1166. Many of these institutional shortcomings will be addressed by the formation
of the World Trade Organization. See GATT, Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization [World Trade Organization], Doc. MTN/FA, pt. II (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 13
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
78. Very early in the GATT negotiations, there was a proposal to include a provision
accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.6/65/Rev.2, at 5 (memorandum from
the Secretariat, Feb. 12, 1947); however, this provision was promptly rejected. U.N. Doc.
E/PC/TIC.6/87, at 3 (meeting Feb. 14, 1947).
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fact, "[t]here exists no official definition of a 'GATT dispute' or a
'GATT dispute settlement' procedure."
79
The contracting parties have built upon language in Article XXIII,
which provides a mechanism in the event that consultations between the
disputing nations are unsuccessful.80 Over time, the contracting parties
have institutionalized a practice whereby they appoint a panel of indi-
viduals to consider a dispute.8 1 The panels receive submissions from the
contending parties and may receive submissions from other interested
nations. The panels then issue proposed reports to the contending parties
for their review and comments. Following consideration of the comments,
the panel submits its report on the dispute to, the GATT Council. 2 A
report is of no force until it is adopted by the Council. Typically, the
Council will not adopt a report absent consensus.
83
In trade-environment conflicts, this dispute resolution process is
skewed against environmental interests in several important respects. For
example, GATT panels have placed the burden of proof on the party
relying upon the Article XX exception. 4 Given the substantial scientific
79. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Improvement in the GATT Dispute Settlement
System: A Survey and Comparative Analysis, in FOREIGN TRADE IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 340, 341 (Dettu Chr. Dikce et al. eds., 1988).
80. Under Article XXIII, the aggrieved party can refer the matter to the contracting parties.
The contracting parties, acting as a group, are then to investigate the matter and make
appropriate recommendations or rulings. If necessary, the group may authorize the complaining
party to take retaliatory action against the respondent to compensate for damages suffered by
the complainant. GATT, supra note 9, art. XXIII. Such a retaliation has only been authorized
once under Article XXIII. GATT, Netherlands-Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the
United States, BISD 32 (1st Supp. 1953).
Article XXIII, however, simply provides an outline of the various stages to be followed
as a dispute advances through the GATT system. It does not establish any formal rules or
procedures for handling or resolving such disputes.
81. GATT, Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, BISD 210 (26th Supp. 1979) [hereinafter GATT Understanding]; GATT,
Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Procedures, BISD 13 (29th Supp. 1982)
[hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]; GATT, Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute
Settlement Rules and Procedures, BISD 61 (36th Supp. 1990). For a history of the early use
of dispute resolution panels, see HUDEC, supra note 6, at 74-83.
82. The GATT Council meets between the yearly meetings of the contracting parties.
Council membership is open to all contracting parties willing to participate. JACKSON & DAVEY
supra note 6, at 318-320.
83. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 81. See also Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson,
The Road from GAT to MTO, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 37 (1994) (GATT practice of
decisionmaking by consensus dates back to 1959). The Uruguay Round agreements will change
this practice. Under the new WTO, panel reports will be adopted unless there is a consensus
not to adopt the report. GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round):
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, para. 16.4 (Dec.
15, 1993) 33 I.L.M. 112, 123 (1994) [hereinafter GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations].
84. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 5.22.
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uncertainty that marks much regulation in the international environmental
arena, this risk of nonpersuasion may often be outcome determinative.
In addition, panel members are chosen for their expertise in "trade
relations, economic development and other matters covered by the
General Agreement., 85 Panel members are often well-schooled in, and
supportive of, the GATT system.86 There is no requirement that panel
members have any environmental expertise. "The natural effect of the
appointment process is an implicit and unavoidable bias in favor of trade
rules. 87 In addition, the GATT panelists typically do not apply interna-
tional law other than GATT law in any dispute.88 Thus, they generally do
not consider more recent international environmental treaties that may be
relevant to a particular dispute.
No formal mechanism ensures that the panel will have access to
environmental expertise. The GATT's procedures do not permit partici-
pation by nongovernmental organizations. Although panels are free to
request scientific or technical assistance,89 calling outside experts is a
rarity. Thus, for example, the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report did not hear a
scientific or ecological defense of the U.S. ban on Mexican tuna from any
environmental experts. 9°
Finally, GATT dispute resolution is largely a closed process. The
parties' submissions, the oral arguments, and the transcripts of the panel's
proceedings are all confidential. 9' Even the final panel reports, until
85. The GATT Director General maintains a list of such persons from which panelists are
selected. GATT Understanding, supra note 81, at 212.
86. Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a
Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1992); Rosine
Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GA7T Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB.
53, 65-72 (1987).
87. Housman & Zaelke, supra note 54, at 568.
88. Daniel Magraw, NAFTA's Repercussions: Is Green Trade Possible?, 36 ENVTL. L. 14,
16 (1994).
89. As noted above, the panel considering the U.S. challenge to Thailand's ban on foreign
cigarettes heard testimony from the WHO regarding the health basis for cigarette regulation.
See Thai Cigarette Case, supra note 22, paras. 3, 5, 50-57.
90. Indeed, the Panel declined the opportunity to hear such arguments. Goldman, supra
note 86, at 1286 n.33.
91. This secrecy has been the subject of sharp criticism. Senator Max Baucus, Chair of
the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade, recently called for transparency in GATT
dispute resolution procedures. He noted that "[o]nly opening up the process will lift the cloud
of mistrust that permeates the [trade-environment] debate. The public is most likely to fear
secrecy, and must be assured that environmental concerns are receiving appropriate weight in
trade decisions." Sen. Baucus Calls on GATT Negotiators To Take Account of Environmental
Issues, Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 10, 1993).
The near-total secrecy cloaking GATT dispute resolution procedures conflicts with U.S.
law. A federal district court recently ruled that U.S. submissions to GATT panels and
unadapted GATT panel reports must be released to the public after a request under the Freedom
of Information Act. Public Citizen v. Office of United States Trade Representative, 804 F.
Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1992).
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adopted, are not public documents. Thus, no opportunity exists for
nongovernmental organizations to participate in trade-environment
disputes.92 This closed process is inimical to sound environmental
decisionmaking, which is premised upon public participation and open
decisionmaking.
93
4. The Proposed Cures
No answer is what the wrong question begets.. .. 94
The GATT as a forum for the resolution of trade-environment issues
has generated widespread international dissatisfaction. The Tuna-Dolphin
Panel Report, in particular, has sparked a storm of protest. 95 For example,
following release of this report, the European Community Parliament
called for a two-year moratorium on all GATT panel reports on environ-
mental issues.96
In light of this dissatisfaction, a number of institutional "cures" have
been proposed. However, as demonstrated more fully below, each of
these proposals has serious legal and political drawbacks. More funda-
mentally, none of these proposed cures will work, because none address
the core problems: the GATT's institutional mission to eliminate barriers
to trade, the lack of an institutional mandate to advance global environ-
mental interests, and the institutional inability to identify and value
adequately environmental interests in the context of trade-environment
conflicts.
92. The GATT could have been drafted to allow nongovernmental organizations to
participate. The draft ITO Charter provided for "suitable arrangements for consultation and co-
operation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with matters within the scope of this
Charter." Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23
ENVTL. L. 475, 511 n.164 (1993) (quoting the ITO Charter, art. 87, para. 2).
93. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 43, princ. 10 (environmental issues "are best
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level"); Agenda 21, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.15.1/4, paras. 8.4, 8.11 (1992), reprinted in 2 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED
PROCEEDINGS 47-1,057 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1992) (need to ensure access by public to
relevant information and allow effective participation on national level and to promote public
awareness and exchange of information) [hereinafter 2 AGENDA 21].
94. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (1962).
95. See, e.g., Environmental Group Says GATT Tuna Report Could Have Disastrous
Conservation Impact, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1325 (Sept. II, 1991).
96. EUR. PARL. RES. A3-0329/92 (Jan. 22, 1993). See also EC Parliament Adopts Two-
Year Moratorium on GATE Panel Environmental Decisions, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 136
(Jan. 26, 1993). As Steve Charnovitz has noted, this call has not dissuaded the EC from
pressing its own GATT complaint over the MMPA provisions at issue in the U.S.-Mexico
Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report. Charnovitz, supra note 52, at 46. See also Tuna-Dolphin Panel
Report II, supra note 43.
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a. Amend the GATT
The shortcomings identified above could, in theory, be addressed
through one or more amendments to the GATT. The Tuna-Dolphin Panel
Report strongly suggested that adequate resolution of the conflicts
between international environmental measures and international trade law
might require a GATT amendment. 97 A number of commentators have
suggested that Article XX be either amended or expanded to ensure that
trade measures do not run afoul of the GATT. 98
However, these proposals seem to ignore GATT institutional and
political realities. The General Agreement provides for amendment "upon
acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting parties." 99 As a political
matter, it would appear to be virtually impossible to obtain the necessary
political support to amend Article XX in the manner suggested above.
Indeed, in 1991, the Negotiating Group on GATT Articles rejected a
suggestion that would have added the phrase "the environment" to Article
XX(b).1°° Similarly, the reaction of GATT contracting parties to the U.S.
embargo of Mexican tuna may be a rough indication of the enthusiasm
that would meet any effort to amend the GATT to permit environmental
trade measures.'01
The combination of widely divergent interests among the large GATT
membership and the fairly stringent voting and procedural requirements
produces the political reality that, even on issues less controversial than
97. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 6.3 (if the GATT contracting parties
want to permit trade measures like the U.S. tuna embargo, they should "do so not by interpret-
ing Article XX, but by amending or supplementing the provisions of the General Agreement").
98. One suggestion is that a new provision be added to permit trade measures "imposed
for the protection of the environment, ecological or biological resources, . . . whether within
or outside the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party enacting the measure." Eric Christensen &
Samantha Geffin, GATT Sets its Net on Environmental Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on
Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of the International Trading System,
23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 569, 608-09 (1991-92).
Others call for amendments to permit measures relating to the protection of the environ-
ment, Patterson, supra note 22, passim, or measures "designed ... to encourage or ensure
protection of [the] environment and promote sustainable development." CHARLES ARDEN-
CLARKE, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 7 (1991). Proposals to amend the GATT have found some
support in the political community. The U.S. Congress has urged the President to initiate
negotiations to amend Article XX to provide exceptions for trade measures intended to protect
the environment. See H.R. Con. Res. 247, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
99. GATT, supra note 9, art. XXX. As a practical matter, however, most GATT decisions
are made by consensus rather than by vote. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 58, at 705.
100. Friedl Weiss, International Organizations and Bodies: GA7T, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.
L. 346, 350 (1992).
101. Australia, Canada, the European Community, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, the
Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, and Venezuela all filed submissions opposing the MMPA ban.
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this, "[a]mendment of the GATT is no longer a feasible option."' 2 For
these reasons, the GATT amendment procedures simply do not provide
a politically viable mechanism for addressing the GATT's subordination
of environmental considerations to trade interests.
b. Utilize the GATT Waiver Provision
Perhaps implicitly acknowledging that an amendment to permit
greater use of environmental trade measures is unlikely, some have urged
that the international community employ the GATT waiver provision.
These proposals are based on Article XXV(5) of the GATT, which
authorizes the contracting parties, in "exceptional circumstances," to
"waive an obligation imposed upon a Contracting Party by this agree-
ment." Such a waiver requires a "two-thirds majority of the votes cast"
provided that this majority comprises more than half of the contracting
parties.'0 3 The waiver power extends to all GATT obligations.1°4 Citing
this provision, Professor John Jackson has suggested the possibility of "a
five year waiver ... that would specifically refer to certain listed multi-
lateral environmental agreement[sic] ... and provide that actions under
them would not be deemed inconsistent with other GATT rules."1°5
The use of the waiver provision, however, is both undesirable and un-
likely. Adopting a waiver for trade measures implementing the obligations
embodied in certain enumerated environmental treaties would effectively
"freeze" the universe of such permissible trade measures, an undesirable
102. Spencer Weber Waller, Symposium: The Uruguay Round and the Future of World
Trade: Introduction, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1992); JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 6, at
310-11 ("[i]t is generally considered today almost impossible to amend the GATT"). In fact,
there have been no successful attempts to amend the GATT since 1965. Chamovitz, supra note
92, at 515 n.180. Moreover, even if an amendment garners the requisite majority, the General
Agreement provides that those countries that do not accept the amendment are not bound by
it. GATT, supra note 9, art. XXX.
The new WTO will likewise require a supermajority vote for most amendments. See WTO
Agreement, supra note 77, art. X, 20-21.
103. Article XXV(5)(a) reads, in relevant part:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party
by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-
thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half
of the contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 9, art. XXV(5)(a).
The waiver provision will be changed somewhat by the Uruguay Round agreements which
provide for waivers upon approval of three-fourths of the Members. WTO Agreement, supra
note 77, art. IX(3).
104. See GATT Doc. L/403 (Sept. 7, 1955), quoted in JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 6,
at 313 [hereinafter GATT Doc. L/403]; GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX 147 (1973) (quoting report
of the London preparatory meeting for the Havana Conference, GATT, Waiver Granted in
Connection with the European Coal and Steel Community, BISD 17 (1st Supp. 1953)).
105. Jackson, supra note 23, at 1271.
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result given the rapid pace at which international environmental law is
developing.'°6 Under this scenario, no new measure, whether multilateral
or unilateral, could be assured of GATT consistency unless a
supermajority of the contracting parties agrees to the new waiver.
More importantly, the use of an Article XXV waiver in this manner
sends the wrong signal with respect to the relationship between interna-
tional environmental law and international trade law. Reliance on a
waiver suggests that international environmental policies are subordinate
to international trade policies - that only those environmental trade
measures that have been singled out and identified by the GATT con-
tacting parties are legitimate international policy tools. To use the waiver
provision to "resolve" trade-environment conflicts is to give the GATT
an effective veto over the use of environmental trade measures.
Such a privileging of trade interests over ecological interests is
inappropriate. Certain trade measures can serve paramount environmental
interests at little cost to the trade regime. Therefore, it makes little sense
to elevate a priori one set of interests above the other.'0 7
In addition, formidable political'0 8 and technical"° difficulties would
106. See, e.g., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT
THE ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE vii, USITC Pub. No. 2351 (1991) (identifying 170
international environmental conventions and noting that approximately two-thirds of them have
been signed in the past two decades).
107. See Dunoff, supra note 25, at 1449-50.
108. As in the amendment context, it would be extremely difficult to obtain a
supermajority of states voting for such a waiver. The reality is that "international environmental
agreements often go into force with a small nucleus of countries that may fall far short of two-
thirds of the GATT." Steve Charnovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues, 4
INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 203, 217 (1992). For example, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243
[hereinafter C.I.T.E.S.], which now has 115 signatories, went into force with just ten countries.
Trade measures enacted pursuant to "regional [environmental] agreements might also have a
difficult time gaining a GATT supermajority." Charnovitz, supra, at 217.
109. It is extremely unlikely that an environmental waiver satisfies the "exceptional
circumstances" necessary to invoke an Article XXV waiver. Although the General Agreement
does not define this term, the GATT Executive Secretary has stated that this term is "clearly
designed to limit the use of the waiver provision to individual problems to which the agreement
as written does not provide an adequate solution and where an amendment would result in a
modification both broader in its application and more permanent than is required." GATT Doc.
L/403, supra note 104, at 314. Given the recent explosion in the number of environmental
treaties, see U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 106, such agreements are "increasingly
unexceptional." Charnovitz, supra note 108, at 217.
In addition, Article XXV's drafting history suggests that the waiver provision is intended
to be used "only in cases ... involving hardship to a particular member .... GATT Doc.
[U403, supra note 104, at 315. As environmental trade measures generally affect a great number
of nations, it is unlikely that they will raise issues involving a hardship only to "a particular
member" of the GATT system.
The waiver procedures have been used in the past in circumstances that appear to be
outside Article XXV's intended scope. For example, in 1971, the contracting parties voted a
waiver authorizing developed nations to depart from MFN to the extent necessary to grant tariff
preferences to developing nations. Generalized System of Preferences, GATT Doc. [U3545,
BISD 24 (18th Supp. 1972). See also Differential and More Favorable Treatment: Reciprocity
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc. [/4903 (Dec. 3, 1979) (decision
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accompany any effort to use the waiver process. For all of these reasons,
the problems posed by trade-environment conflicts are unlikely to be
solved through the use of the GATT waiver provisions.
c. Negotiate a Separate "Environmental Code"
Given the difficulties of negotiating GATT amendments and waivers,
the contracting parties have from time to time entered into "side agree-
ments" or "side codes." These agreements are often negotiated and
administered in the GATT context but are not part of the General Agree-
ment. Since the release of the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, there have
been calls for the negotiation of a GATT "Environmental Code" in a
"Green Round" of negotiations.'"0
Waiting for a currently unscheduled Green Round of GATT negotia-
tions to address trade-environment conflicts is the legal equivalent of
waiting for Godot. The recently concluded Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions dragged on for seven years and missed a series of deadlines. The
GATT's Director of the Trade and Environment Division has declared
that a Green Round "is unlikely to begin within ten years given the
of the contracting parties to continue the GSP program). It has been argued that this waiver is
inconsistent with the limitations imposed by Article XXV. See, e.g., Hector Gros Espiell,
GATT: Accommodating Generalized Preferences, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 341 (1974). In this
instance, the contracting parties considered an amendment but rejected this option because of
the difficulties associated with the amendment process. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 6, at
318.
Notwithstanding the technical difficulties, the GSP waiver was possible because an
overwhelming majority of nations was strongly in favor of the GSP program. See Gerald M.
Meier, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Developing Countries, 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1980). In contrast, there is little consensus in the GAT'T context
regarding the nature or scope of an environmental waiver.
110. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 92, at 510-1I; Split Among Environmentalists on
NAFTA Healed in United Support of GAT Reforms, Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 6, 1993)
(coalition of environmental organizations call for formation of Green Round of GAT
negotiations); GAT Green Round Said Likely to Pit Environmentalists Against Third World,
Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 7, 1993) (predicting that a Green Round of negotiations would
pit environmentalists against developing nations). See also Environmental Code Should Be
Condition for Ratification of GATT, Dutch Official Told, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 259 (Mar.
23, 1994) (Dutch environmental nongovernmental organization calls for E.U. to "suspend their
ratification" of the GATT pending establishment of a comprehensive "Environmental Code").
There have been different proposals for the content of the Environmental Code. For
example, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade has proposed a
GAT'T Environmental Code that would permit the imposition of countervailing duties on
imports from countries whose environmental standards are lower than those in the importing
nation. 137 CONG. REC. S 13,169 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus). See also
Schoenbaum, supra note 58, at 723 (discussing similar proposals); Patterson, supra note 22,
at 105-06. Another idea is for the proposed Code to "set out minimum levels of pollution
control and environmental quality with respect to certain key economic sectors, such as import-
sensitive industries." Schoenbaum, supra note 58, at 723.
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schedules foreseen for implementing the results of the Uruguay
Round... 1 ' However, as even GATT officials concede, "[a]ddressing the
trade and environment interface cannot wait that long."' 12 The urgency of
global environmental problems mandates that these issues not be relegated
to an unscheduled round of GATT negotiations.
Moreover, a negotiating round devoted to environmental issues would
be extremely unlikely to promote significant environmental reform of the
GATT. Negotiators of the ambitious Uruguay Round texts were able to
reach agreement, in part, because of the wide range of issues on the table
which permitted nations to engage in a variety of trade-offs across issues.
As a result, virtually every participating nation achieved at least some of
its negotiating objectives and had a stake in a successful conclusion of the
round. A round that focuses on a single set of issues cannot generate the
possibility of such trade-offs. The nations seeking to "Green the GATT"
through such a round will not have inducements to encourage the cooper-
ation of nations resistant to environmental reform of this trade body.", 3
As demonstrated above, none of the frequently proposed cures are
satisfactory. With respect to the search for a reformation of the GATT to
incorporate a commitment to sustainable development, "[n]o answer is
what the wrong question begets, for the excellent reason that the [GATT]
was not framed to be a catalogue of answers to such questions. And,
indeed, how could it have been, consistently with the intention to write
a charter for [the international trade regime]?"
'" 14
As presently constituted, the GATT is fundamentally incapable of
addressing today's pressing global environmental issues. The GATT lacks
the institutional mandate to advance global environmental interests. It
possesses neither the competence nor the expertise to evaluate envi-
ronmental threats. It systematically subordinates environmental interests
to trade interests where the two are in conflict. Those interested in a more
balanced approach to trade-environment issues need to look elsewhere for
an appropriate institution to consider these issues.
11. Richard Eglin, Enlisting the Support of Liberal Trade for Environmental Protection
and Sustainable Development, 23 ENVTL. L. 697, 700 (1993). See also Keith Bradsher, U.S.
Politicians Turn Into Lobbyists Over GAT, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at A39 (U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor states that environmental issues would have to wait for next
round of international trade talks which convene, on average, once a decade).
112. Eglin, supra note 111, at 700.
113. Robert Housman and David Wirth have made this point. Robert Housman, Testimony
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, FED. Doc. CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY (Feb.
3, 1994); Telephone conversation with David Wirth, Mar. 25, 1994.
114. BICKEL, supra note 94, at 103.
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B. The Trade Regime II: NAFTA
Conflicts between trade-environment interests will be considered
under the auspices of NAFTA." 5 While NAFTA reproduces much of the
form and substance of the GATT approach to these issues, NAFTA does
include some significant departures from the GATT framework. Ulti-
mately, however, like the GATT, NAFTA is primarily designed to reduce
barriers to trade. Moreover, like the GATT, the treaty does not give
sufficient priority to international environmental interests.
1. The Substantive Regime
NAFTA creates a free-trade area comprised of Mexico, Canada, and
the United States. This treaty incorporates a schedule of staged tariff
reductions on qualifying goods from each NAFTA signatory, leading to
the progressive elimination of all tariffs on trade between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico.'" 6 The agreement creates the world's largest
free-trade zone, stretching from the Yukon to the Yucatan, with a com-
bined gross national product of approximately $6 trillion.
1 7
The treaty also includes provisions similar to those found in the
GATT regarding most-favored-nation treatment, national treatment, rules
of origin, and customs procedures. Under the agreement, the three
countries are to eliminate prohibitions and quantitative restrictions applied
at the border, such as quotas and import licenses. In addition, NAFTA
includes provisions designed to reduce barriers to trade in services."1
8
115. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S. [hereinafter
NAFTA].
The environmental implications of the NAFTA have been ably discussed by a number of
other commentators. See, e.g., Robert F. Housman & Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and
Environmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and
a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719 (1993); Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA: An
Analysis of its Environmental Provisions, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,068 (1993) [hereinafter
Charnovitz, NAFTA]; Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Green
Law or Green Spin (unpublished manuscript, on file with MICH. J. INT'L L.) [hereinafter
Charnovitz, Green Spin]; Stewart, supra note 50, at 751; SIERRA CLUB, ANALYSIS OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1993). Rather than reproduce this analysis, this section is
limited to a discussion of the subordination of environmental interests by this trade regime.
116. The treaty builds upon the existing Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22-23,
1987 & Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 781
[hereinafter Can.-U.S. FTA], and includes that agreement's exemptions for Canadian cultural
industries and certain agricultural commodities.
117. See White House Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 28 Wkly.
Compil. Pres. Doc. 1424 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet].
118. NAFTA, supra note 115, chs. 12-14 (Cross-Border Trade in Services, Telecom-
munications, and Financial Services respectively).
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NAFTA also includes provisions that remove significant investment
barriers, ensure basic protections for NAFTA investors, and provide a
mechanism to resolve disputes between investors and NAFTA coun-
tries. '9 Finally, NAFTA sets out certain basic protections for intellectual
property rights.
120
NAFTA supporters have often proclaimed the treaty's environmental
virtues. 121 Close examination reveals, however, that even the treaty's
"green provisions" subordinate environmental interests to economic ones.
A good example is NAFTA's treatment of trade obligations imposed by
international environmental agreements. A number of environmental
treaties require nations to restrict or prohibit trade in harmful goods.
NAFTA provides that trade obligations set out in certain enumerated
international environmental treaties "shall prevail" over any inconsisten-
cies in NAFTA.1
22
Although NAFTA backers claim that this provision is an unprece-
dented clause affirming the supremacy of international environmental
agreements, 123 not all measures taken pursuant to international environ-
mental obligations "shall prevail" over NAFTA obligations. Rather, such
measures will survive NAFTA scrutiny only "provided that where a party
119. ld., ch. 11.
120. Id., ch. 17.
121. See, e.g., The Role of Science in Adjudicating Trade Disputes Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (Sept. 30, 1992) (testimony of Charles Roh, Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for North American Affairs) ("this agreement does more to improve
the environment than any other agreement in history"); News Conference with William Reilly,
EPA Administrator, Fed. News Serv., Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
FEDNEW File (NAFTA is the "greenest free trade agreement ever").
122. NAFrA, supra note 115, art. 104. This provision applies to C.I.T.E.S., supra note
108; the Montreal Protocol, supra note 26; and the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, reprinted
in 28 I.L.M. 649.
Two additional bilateral agreements are subject to Article 104. See NAFTA Annex 104.1
(listing the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment
in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, Mex.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827, as well as the annexes to
this agreement, and the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste,
Oct. 26, 1986, Can.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 11,099, as subject to Article 104). Interior Secretary
Bruce Babbitt has stated that a "verbal agreement" has been reached by the three NAFTA
nations "to add the Migratory Bird Treaties to [Article 104]." Key Officials Address House
Committee on Environmental Benefits ofAgreement, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Nov. 15, 1993).
123. See, e.g., USTR Letter on NAFTA Environmental Standards, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept.
17, 1993, at 4.
As a historical matter, it is far from clear that such a clause is, in fact, unprecedented. It
appears that, at one time, it was rather common for commercial treaties to expressly yield to
provisions of preexisting treaties relating to health or conservation. See, e.g., Charnovitz, Green
Spin, supra note 115 (citing Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and
Germany, Dec. 2, 1924, G.B.-Ger., art. 10, 43 L.N.T.S. 89; Convention between France and
Greece, Mar. 11, 1929, Fra.-Greece, art. 9, 95 L.N.T.S. 403).
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has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of
complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is
the least inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement."' 24 This
language appears to follow closely the "least trade restrictive" interpreta-
tion given to the term "necessary" found in the Article XX exception of
the GATT. 25 This provision also imposes new requirements and new
trade disciplines on parties to these international environmental agree-
ments. 126 Finally, this provision contrasts sharply with NAFTA's treat-
ment of preexisting tax conventions, the provisions of which expressly
and unconditionally take precedence over any inconsistent NAFTA
provisions. 127
NAFTA also addresses the "pollution haven" concern, an issue not
typically addressed by trade agreements. In response to concerns that a
NAFTA party might lower its environmental standards to attract scarce
investment capital, NAFTA provides that "a Party should not waive or
otherwise derogate" from domestic environmental measures to encourage
foreign investment. 128 Significantly, when negotiating this provision, the
Parties considered, but ultimately could not agree on stronger language.
Although the Canadian government had urged use of the mandatory verb
"shall" rather than the hortatory "should," this suggestion was rejected by
the Bush Administration. 1
29
Moreover, a nation that believes another party is lowering its envi-
ronmental standards to encourage foreign investment and thereby failing
to honor the NAFTA provision quoted above cannot utilize the formal
NAFTA dispute settlement processes to resolve this issue. Rather, the
nation can only "request consultations" with the allegedly offending
nation "with a view to avoiding" any encouragement of foreign invest-
ment through relaxation of environmental measures. 30 This procedure for
resolving this type of dispute stands in stark contrast to the procedures for
124. NAFTA, supra note 115, at art. 104(1).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 17-76.
126. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 754-55 & n.175.
127. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 2103.
128. Id. art. 1114(2) (emphasis added).
129. Charnovitz, NAFTA, supra note 115, at 10,072. See also North American Free Trade
Agreement Greeted with Suspicion by Environmental Groups, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept.
10, 1992); Hills Says Rejection of Canadian Green Language in NAFTA Helped Environment,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 28, 1992, at 8; Norma Greenaway, U.S. Set to Unveil Trade Deal
with Canada & Mexico, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Aug. 12, 1992, at AIO. The actual treaty
language thus contradicts a 1992 Presidential statement that NAFTA "prohibits the lowering
of standards to attract investment." White House Fact Sheet, supra note 117, at 1426.
130. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 1114(2).
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resolving other types of investment disputes, which are subject to a
complex, detailed, and binding arbitral regime.1
3'
2. Environmental Measures as Impermissible Barriers to Trade
Environmental measures that affect trade are subject to challenge as
impermissible non-tariff barriers under the chapters on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (S&P) Measures and on Standards-Related Measures
(Standards Chapter). To avoid or prevail in such challenges, NAFTA
strongly encourages each nation to utilize relevant internationally agreed-
upon standards. The treaty provides that environmental measures
restricting trade that conform to international standards are presumptively
valid.
13 2
However, NAFTA parties are not required to use international stan-
dards. NAFTA affirms the "right" of each nation to set an "appropriate
level of protection" for human, animal, or plant life or health and to
implement measures more stringent than international standards.
133
However, such measures are subject to several disciplines.
First, NAFTA disciplines the ability of parties to choose its "appro-
priate level of protection" in different contexts. Parties are directed to
achieve consistency in the level of protection afforded by different
standards. A party is to "avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in
such levels [of protection] in different circumstances, where such dis-
tinctions result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against a good
of another party or constitute a disguised restriction on trade between the
Parties."' 134 Some commentators fear that this clause may preclude the
United States from using regulations designed to achieve different levels
of risk in unrelated areas of conduct. 35 For example, permitting certain
levels of salmonella in chicken while imposing a zero tolerance for
carcinogenic food additives may invite a NAFTA challenge.
36
In addition, NAFTA imposes a series of scientific disciplines on the
use of health and safety standards.137 NAFTA requires that S&P measures
131. Id. arts. 1115-1138(2).
132. Id. arts. 713, 905.
133. Id. arts. 712(1), 904(2).
134. Id. art. 715(3)(b). For similar, precatory language on standards, see id. art. 907(2).
135. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 739; Charnovitz, Green Spin, supra note 115.
136. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 739.
137. The Uruguay Round agreements contain similar scientific disciplines on domestic
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, GATT Doc. MTN/FA.1I.AIA.4 (Dec. 15, 1993). For a thoughtful
discussion of the issues raised by the use of science-based disciplines on environmental
measures in trade agreements, see David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round
and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. (forthcoming 1994).
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be "based on scientific principles, taking into account relevant factors"
and "not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis for it.'
138
Similarly, when setting national regulatory standards other than S&P
measures that are more stringent than international standards, a party
"may .. .conduct an assessment of risk ... tak[ing] into account...
available scientific evidence or technical information.' ' 39 However, the
treaty itself fails to define meaningfully the key terms in these
provisions.' 4° This lack of definition may lead NAFTA dispute resolution
panels to "second-guess" the science that a legislature relied upon when
enacting a standard. 14 1 It also gives panels wide latitude to determine
whether any particular standard satisfies these provisions or is an unjusti-
fied trade barrier. 1
42
The treaty also requires that the S&P measure be "based on a risk
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances.' ' 43 This risk assessment
must take into account international risk assessment methodologies and
"relevant scientific evidence."' 44 Several U.S. health and safety standards
may be vulnerable to challenge under this provision. For example, the
Delaney Clauses 145 ban any amount of carcinogenic pesticide residue in
138. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 712(3).
139. Id. art. 907(l)(a). An "assessment of risk" is an "evaluation of the potential for side
effects." Id. art. 915.
140. For example, a "scientific basis" is defined as "a reason based on data or information
derived using scientific methods." Id. art. 724.
141. This concern is not unfounded. A panel operating under the Can.-U.S. FTA, supra
note 116, rejected Canada's assertion that it needed to inspect all of the commercially-taken
herring and salmon to assure high quality biological data regarding the harvesting and stocks
of these species. In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and
Herring, Panel No. CDA-89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989), available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
USCFTA File [hereinafter Canadian Salmon Case]. The panel determined that "reliable
sampling data can be obtained without requiring access to 100% of the catch." Id. See also
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of Canada, at 16-19, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991)(arguing that the EPA imposed ban on the importation of
asbestos is not supported by adequate scientific evidence, therefore, the ban violates interna-
tional trade law); In the Matter of Puerto Rico's Regulations on the Import, Distribution, and
Sale of U.H.T. Milk from Quebec, Panel No. USA-93-1807-01 (June 3, 1993), available in
LEXIS, INTLAW Library, USCFTA File (rejecting Canada's challenge to the ban on certain
types of milk).
The U.S. Trade Representative has stated that the scientific disciplines "do not involve a
situation where a dispute settlement panel may substitute its scientific judgment for that of the
government maintaining the [sanitary or phytosanitary] measure." Letter from Michael Kantor,
U.S. Trade Representative, to John Adams, Executive Director, Natural Resources Defense
Council (Sept. 13, 1993), reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 17, 1993, at 5. Of course, this
unilateral interpretation, offered after the conclusion of the NAFTA negotiations, is not binding
on a NAFTA panel.
142. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 747-48.
143. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 712(3)(c).
144. Id. art. 715(1)(a) & (1)(b).
145. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 360b(d)(l)(H), & 376(d)(5)(B) (1992).
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processed foods sold in the United States. This standard rests on the
political - rather than scientific - judgment that no risk posed by
carcinogens in the food supply is acceptable. 146 Observers fear that
standards like this would not survive challenge under NAFTA.
147
In addition, NAFTA disciplines are expressly applicable to state and
local measures, as well as federal provisions. Thus, NAFTA provides that
"[tihe Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order
to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including their obser-
vance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and
provincial governments.' 48 Under this language, a state that prohibits a
pesticide permitted to be used under federal law149 or enacts a food safety
regulation more stringent than the federal standard 5' faces a possible
challenge from Canada or Mexico that such measures are impermissible
barriers to trade.' 5'
In addition, NAFTA's S&P and Standards chapters impose many of
the disciplines found in the GATT and thus incorporate many of the
shortcomings in the GATT system outlined above. For example, the S&P
chapter reproduces the GATT distinction between standards regulating a
product and standards regulating the process by which a product is
146. This "zero risk" requirement has been upheld in U.S. courts. Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d
985 (9th Cir. 1992); Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Cosmetic
Toiletry and Fragrance Assoc. v. Public Citizen, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
147. See Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 739-49. See also The Role of Science
in Adjudicating Trade Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing
Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (Sept. 30,
1992) (Testimony of Professor David Wirth) [hereinafter Wirth Testimony].
148. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 105. See also id. arts. 709, 711 (requiring Party to
ensure that any nongovernmental entity upon which it relies in applying a S&P measure
complies with the treaty's S&P provisions); id. art. 902 (requiring a Party to ensure that state
and local standardizing bodies comply with the treaty's substantive obligations regarding
standards and related measures).
The GATT, in contrast, requires each contracting party to "take such reasonable measures
as may be available to it to ensure observance" by state and local governments. GATT, supra
note 9, art. XXIV(12). But see GATT, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, Panel report DS/23R, para. 5.48 (Feb. 7, 1992) ("GATT law is part of federal law
in the United States and as such is superior to inconsistent state law"); Jackson, supra note 6,
at 116 (GATT obligates a contracting party's executive to prevent local laws or actions that
violate GATT).
149. States possess such authority, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1992), and have exercised it. See,
e.g., IOWA CODE § 2-6.32 (1989) (prohibiting sale and use of chlordane); MD. CODE ANN.,
AGRIC. § 5-210.5 (1991) (restricting use of chlordane and other chemicals).
150. California Proposition 65 imposes certain requirements on the sale of foods, drugs,
and cosmetics. California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (Deering 1986).
151. See Charnovitz, NAFTA, supra note 115, at 10,069-70; Housman & Orbuch, supra
note 115, at 737; Patti A. Goldman, The Legal Effect of Trade Agreements on Domestic Health
and Environmental Regulations, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 11 (1992).
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produced. 52 In addition, although the parties have discretion in setting
standards, the S&P chapter limits the permissible trade measures that can
be used to achieve such protection. Thus, any trade measure may be
applied only to the extent "necessary" to achieve the nation's chosen level
of protection. 153 As NAFTA incorporates GATT's obligations by refer-
ence, 154 it is quite possible that the term "necessary" will be interpreted
as narrowly in the NAFTA context as it has been by successive GATT
dispute resolution panels.1
5
NAFTA's substantive regime reflects GATT jurisprudence in another
important respect. NAFTA Article 2101 provides that
GATT Article XX and its interpretative notes ... . are incorporated
into and made a part of this Agreement. The parties understand that
the measures referred to in GATT Article XX(b) include environ-
mental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, and that GATT Article XX(g) applies to measures relating
to the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural
resources.
Assuming that the provisions of GATT Article XX would be interpreted
by NAFTA dispute, resolution panels as they have been interpreted by
GATT dispute resolution panels, 56 NAFTA would thus restrict the use of
trade measures to protect global commons resources. In addition, as
NAFTA requires that environmental trade measures be "necessary,"
Parties will likely need to employ trade measures that are the "least trade
restrictive," even if such measures are not the most effective policy tool.
Although there have been no such challenges to date, it is significant
that even before it came into force, NAFTA led to the amendment of
several U.S. health and safety laws. The legislation implementing NAFTA
amended five federal health-related import bans. 157 Four of these
152. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 738-39 (NAFTA's failure to eliminate the
distinction between standards regulating the product and standards regulating the production
process restricts the ability of the United States to exclude products produced in an environ-
mentally damaging manner); Stewart, supra note 50, at 761 (NAFTA provisions relating to
S&P and other product standards do not authorize trade restrictions against products because
of the adverse environmental effect of their production processes).
153. NAF'A, supra note 115, arts. 709, 712(1) & 712(5).
154. Id. art. 103(1).
155. See Wirth Testimony, supra note 147; Charnovitz, NAFTA, supra note 115. For an
analysis of the interpretation of the term "necessary" in the GATT context, see supra text
accompanying notes 69-77.
156. Identical language in the Can.-U.S. FTA has been interpreted in the same manner as
GATT dispute resolution panels. See, e.g., Canadian Salmon Case, supra note 141.
157. For more on these amendments, see Steve Charnovitz, No 7me for NEPA: Trade
Agreements and the Fast Track, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 195 (1994).
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amendments weakened food safety and agricultural laws only for imports
from Canada and/or Mexico.
3. Dispute Resolution Provisions
Unlike the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which
was not intended to be an international institution and did not have
detailed provisions on dispute resolution, the NAFTA negotiators gave
careful attention to the resolution of disputes among the Parties. 158 Several
of the provisions on dispute settlement are significant with respect to
trade-environment issues.
First, NAFTA contains a provision regarding forum selection-when
environmental measures allegedly conflict with trade rules. In general, if
a dispute arises under both NAFTA and the GATT, the parties may use
the dispute resolution procedures available under either treaty. 59 How-
ever, NAFTA provides that a party defending a S&P Standard or a Stan-
dard-Related Measure can choose to defend its regulation before a
NAFTA panel.' 6° This forum selection provision also applies to chal-
lenges to standards implementing specified international environmental
treaties.' 6' However, the responding party's ability to select the forum is
not unlimited. The treaty permits the responding party to force the dispute
to its choice of forum only if the standard affects the party's domestic
environment. 162 This suggests that the responding party does not have the
ability to select the forum if its standard protects the "global com-
~163mons."
Another important NAFTA provision relates to the burden of proof
in challenges to environmental measures. The S&P chapter provides that
"a Party asserting that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure of another
Party is inconsistent with this section shall have the burden of
158. NAFTA creates a three-tiered dispute resolution process. The first tier consists of
formal consultation between the disputing parties. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 2006(1). If
consultation fails to resolve the matter within forty-five days, any Party has the right to call a
meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to consider the matter. Id. art. 2007. In the
event that the Commission is unable to arrange a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter,
any Party involved in the dispute may request the formation of a dispute resolution panel. Id.
art. 2008(1). The analysis in this article focuses primarily on the provisions regarding dispute
resolution panels.
159. Id. art. 2005(1).
160. Id. art. 2005(4).
161. Id. art. 2005(3).
162. Id. art. 2005(4)(a).
163. See Charnovitz, NAFTA, supra note 115, at 10,070. As explained, trade measures
designed to protect the global commons will not fall within the scope of GATT's Article XX(b)
exception for trade measures necessary to protect plant, animal, or human life or health. See
supra text accompanying notes 25-43.
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establishing the inconsistency,"'"' and the Standards chapter has similar
language.165 As the Canadian government stated, "in the event of a
dispute, the environment would be given the benefit of the doubt."'" This
would appear to be a significant departure from practice under the GATT,
where the party arguing that a trade measure is justified under an Article
XX exception has the burden of proof.67
However, a number of commentators have questioned the meaning
and significance of this provision. There is some question as to whether
this clause imposes only a prima facie burden on the challenging party,
with the actual burden of proof shifted to the defending party once the
prima facie case is made. 16 The burden of proof issue is unlikely to be
clarified until an actual dispute between the parties is adjudicated.
169
Moreover, in a number of contexts, the burden of proof will be on the
party defending the trade measure. For example, if a complaining nation
establishes that a trade measure violates a NAFTA provision, the respon-
dent nation may attempt to rely on the "exceptions" provisions in
NAFTA Chapter 21. These provisions expressly incorporate GATT
Article XX. Under this provision, the burden will be on the responding
party. Similarly, a nation attempting to defend a trade measure under an
international treaty other than a treaty listed in Article 104 will likely
have the burden of proof in defending its measure under NAFTA Article
2101.70
Other NAFTA provisions reproduce many of the shortcomings found
in the GATT dispute settlement system. For example, NAFTA lacks any
164. NAFrA, supra note 115, art. 723(6).
165. Id. art. 914(4).
166. Government of Canada, North American Free Trade Agreement, CAN. ENVTL. REV.,
Oct. 1992, at 70. See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NAFTA AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 2 (1992) (burden of proof standard will enhance environmental protection by
ensuring that stringent regulatory standards remain viable).
167. Although the General Agreement does not explicitly discuss which party has the
burden of proof, successive panel reports have placed this burden on the party attempting to
defend its trade measure. See, e.g., Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 5.22 &
n.39.
168. See Industry Policy Advisory Committee for Trade and Policy Matters, Report on the
North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 14, 1992, at 14 (S&P chapter imposes a prima
facie burden of proof on complaining party), cited in Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at
744 n. 120. See also James E. Bailey, Free Trade and the Environment-Can NAFTA Reconcile
the Irreconcilable, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 839, 853 (1993) (arguing that Article 723(6)
creates a shifting burden of proof).
169. See Possibility of Amending GATT Sanitary Provisions Discussed, PESTICIDE & TOXIC
CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 18, 1992, at 28 (EPA Deputy Director, Policy and International Affairs
Division, states that burden of proof "could be the preponderance of the evidence" standard but
that "until an adjudication we don't know.").
170. See, e.g., Charnovitz, Green Spin, supra note 115.
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requirement that panels considering environmental cases include any
panelists with environmental expertise. Rather, the treaty requires only
that panelists "have expertise or experience in law, international trade,
other matters covered by this Agreement or the resolution of disputes
arising under international trade agreements .. ".."", This omission is
especially troubling given that NAFTA panels will have five members,
while GATT panels generally consist of three members.
1 72
Another area where significant improvement over the GATT system
should have been made concerns the ability of a panel to obtain scientific
or technical advice. Astonishingly, there is no guarantee that a NAFTA
dispute resolution panel considering a trade-environment conflict will
receive scientific or technical information regarding the challenged
environmental measure. Rather, NAFTA provides that at the request of
a disputing party, or on its own initiative, "the panel may seek
information and technical advice from any person or body that it deems
appropriate, provided that the disputing Parties so agree .... , Dispute
resolution panels may also request written reports from special "scientific
review boards" formed under the treaty "on any factual issue concerning
environmental, health, safety or other scientific matters raised by a
disputing Party in a proceeding.... , 174 Again, however, the Panels need
the consent of the parties.
75
Serious drawbacks are created by conditioning the use of technical
and scientific information on the consent of the parties. "Because a
disputing party is unlikely to agree to the use of a scientific review
board's report which would prejudice its position, NAFTA cannot
guarantee that a scientific review board will be established. 176 In addi-
tion, the scope of expert information provided to the dispute resolution
panels is limited by conditions set by the disputing parties and by the
treaty, which permits a report on "factual issue[s]" only.1 77 So limiting the
input of a scientific review board may preclude a panel from taking full
advantage of environmental expertise when considering environmental
issues. 17
171. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 2009(2)(a).
172. Charnovitz, NAFTA, supra note 115, at 10,071.
173. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 2014.
174. Id. art. 2015(1).
175. Id.
176. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 748.
177. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 2015.
178. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 115, at 748.
Summer 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Finally, NAFTA, like the GATT, takes affirmative steps to eliminate
public access to and participation in dispute resolution procedures. Under
NAFTA, a dispute resolution "panel's hearings, deliberations and initial
report, and all written submissions to and communications with the panel,
shall be confidential."'' 9 Even the final report may be kept confidential,
if the Commission so decides. 180 Although the rules of procedure have not
yet been promulgated, nothing in the treaty requires or invites public
participation in the dispute resolution process.' 8' In this sense, the
NAFTA dispute resolution process differs little from the widely criticized
GATT process.
182
4. The Environmental Side Agreement
In response to criticisms of NAFTA's provisions regarding environ-
mental issues, the NAFTA parties negotiated a side agreement called the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
("NAAEC").183 This agreement establishes a Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation ("CEC") comprising a Council, a Secretariat, and a
Joint Public Advisory Committee.
84
The Council consists of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties.'8 5
It is designed to provide a forum for the discussion of environmental
issues affecting the three nations and to develop nonbinding recommenda-
tions on a variety of environmental issues. 186 The Council will cooperate
with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission by "contributing to the preven-
tion or resolution of environment-related trade disputes. '1 87 The Council
is to accomplish this by addressing disputes and by identifying experts
able to provide information or technical advice to other NAFTA bodies. '88
179. NAFTA, supra note 115, art. 2012(1). The selection of a scientific board is likewise
confidential. Id. art. 2015(2).
180. Id. art. 2017(4).
181. See, e.g., id. arts. 2004, 2013 (discussing the roles of the parties in the dispute
resolution process).
182. See, e.g., Environmental Safeguards for the North American Free Trade Agreement,
June 1992, at 8 (joint statement of 13 environmental groups urging public participation in
dispute resolution process).
183. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC].
184. Id. art. 8.
185. Id. art. 9.
186. Id. art. 10(l)(a), 10(2).




The Secretariat will be headed by an Executive Director, appointed
by the Council for a three-year term and removable only for cause. 89
The Executive Director and her staff will be independent: "the Executive
Director and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any
government. Each party shall respect the international character of the
responsibilities of the Executive Director and the staff and shall not seek
to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities."' 90 The
Secretariat is to provide "technical, administrative and operational support
to the Council."' 9' It is also to prepare an annual report on the state of the
environment in the territories of the NAFTA parties and a variety of other
environmental issues. However, in preparing these reports, the Secretariat
has few independent investigative powers and must rely on publicly
available information.
The Public Advisory Committee consists of individuals appointed by
the NAFTA parties. Its principal role is to make nonbinding
recommendations to the Council. It can also comment on Secretariat
reports at the time they are submitted to the Council and before their
release to the general public.
Most notably, the NAAEC provides that "each Party shall effectively
enforce its environmental laws and regulations."1 92 A resident of any party
may complain to the Secretariat that a country is not enforcing its
environmental laws. 93 If the complaint meets certain criteria, the Secre-
tariat will request a response from the Party and may create a factual
record on the issue.194 This factual record will be based on information
developed by the Secretariat and the possible use of outside experts. 95
The Council may decide, by a two-thirds vote, to release this factual
record to the public.
The NAAEC also creates a formal mechanism for "consultation and
resolution of disputes" if there is a "persistent pattern" of failure "to
effectively enforce" domestic environmental laws. 96 However, this
mechanism is limited to pollution control, hazardous waste laws, and laws
189. Id. art. 11(1).
190. Id. art. 11(4).
191. Id. art. 11(5).
192. Id. art. 5.
193. Id. art. 14.
194. Id. arts. 14, 15.
195. Id. art. 15(2), 15(7).
196. Id. art. 22(0).
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concerning wild flora and fauna.197 The dispute resolution process is
triggered only by a two-thirds vote of the Council.
This dispute resolution mechanism consists of several stages. First,
the Parties are to engage in consultations in an attempt to arrive at a
mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter.'98 In the event consultations
are unsuccessful, the matter may be referred to a special session of the
Council.'99 If the matter is still unresolved, the Council may, upon a two-
thirds vote, convene an arbitral panel to consider the allegation of a
persistent pattern of failure to enforce environmental laws.2" The five
person panel shall receive written submissions, hold at least one hear-
ing, 201 and then issue an initial report to the parties. 202 Following the
receipt of comments by any disputing party, the panel will issue a final
report.
20 3
If the panel finds that a Party has engaged in a persistent pattern of
failure to enforce effectively its environmental laws, the disputing parties
are to agree on a mutually satisfactory plan of action.2 4 If they are unable
to do so, or if there is a dispute regarding the implementation of an action
plan, a disputing party may request that the arbitral panel be recon-
vened. 05 If the reconvened panel finds that a Party is not fully imple-
menting an action plan, it may impose a monetary enforcement assess-
ment 2°6 of up to U.S. $20 million.207 The assessment is to be paid into a
NAAEC fund and used to improve or enhance the environment or
environmental law enforcement of the offending Party.20 8 Ultimately, this
sanction can be enforced against the United States and Mexico by trade
sanctions and against Canada by enforcement in Canadian domestic
courts .209
197. Thus, laws governing the exploitation of natural resources and the conservation of
forest, soils, minerals, water, and land are exempt from this process. Id. art. 45(2). Laws
governing worker health and safety are likewise exempt. Id.
198. Id. art. 22.
199. Id. art. 23.
200. Id. art. 24.
201. Id. art. 28.
202. Id. art. 31.
203. Id. arts. 31(5), 32.
204. !d. art. 33.
205. Id. art. 34(1).
206. Id. art. 34(5).
207. Id. annex 34 (providing that maximum assessment shall be no greater than $20
million for the first year after the date of entry into force of the NAAEC, and no greater than
.007 percent of total trade between the Parties thereafter).
208. Id.
209. Id. annex 36(a).
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While this is the first time that an international agreement provides
sanctions for the failure of one country to enforce its own environmental
laws, 'it is unlikely that sanctions will ever be imposed. The complex
procedural framework to be followed before sanctions can be imposed
can last for close to three years if a nation attempts to drag out the
process.20 As Mexico's NAFTA negotiator candidly conceded, "[t]he
time frame of the process makes it very improbable that the stage of
sanctions could be reached. '211
More significantly, the NAAEC dispute resolution process is largely
closed to the public.212 For example, the side agreement does not allow
nongovernmental organizations or the public to submit amicus briefs.
Similarly, the treaty does not require that dispute resolution proceedings,
including hearings, be open to the public. Finally, the NAAEC precludes
any Party from providing a right of action under its law against any other




Although NAFTA has been billed as the "greenest trade agreement
ever," it fails to account adequately for international environmental
interests. Significantly, the agreement imposes several new disciplines on
the ability of parties to employ measures that restrict international trade,
even if those measures are pursuant to an international environmental
treaty. The environmental side agreement does not address this problem.
Rather, the side agreement creates a system for encouraging the enforce-
ment by each party of its domestic environmental laws. This is an
important goal, but the side agreement does little to address the issues
raised by the trade-environment conflicts that will arise under this treaty.
II. THE ADJUDICATORY INSTITUTIONS
A. International Environmental Adjudication:
A Viable Alternative?
International adjudication involves the submission of a dispute to
either a permanent judicial body or an arbitral tribunal for binding
210. Magraw, supra note 88, at 41.
211. Ingrid Negrete, Mexico Official Defends NAFTA Dispute Process, J. OF COM., Aug.
20, 1993, at A3.
212. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 115, at 23.
213. NAAEC, supra note 183, art. 38.
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decision, typically on the basis of international law. 214 The primary
judicial forum for resolving international legal disputes is the ICJ. The
Court is "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations," and all
members of the United Nations are parties to the ICJ Statute.215 The ICJ
is competent to decide environmental disputes,216 and commentators have
repeatedly called for greater use of the Court to resolve international
environmental disputes.217 In addition, at the United Nations Earth
Summit, nations as diverse as New Zealand, Colombia, and Mexico
called for a strengthening of the ICJ's role in the "settlement of disputes
relating to the environment, and urged States to recognize the compulsory
214. Richard B. Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International
Adjudication, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 155 (Lori F.
Damrosch ed., 1987) [hereinafter ICJ CROSSROADS]. "The only difference between arbitration
and judicial settlement lies in the method of selecting the members of these judicial organs.
While in the arbitration proceedings, this is done by agreement between the parties, judicial
settlement presupposes the existence of a standing tribunal with its own bench of judges and
its own rules of procedure which parties to a dispute must accept." GEORGE
SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (6th ed. 1976).
Although this article does not discuss international arbitration in any detail, many of the
disadvantages of litigation may be applied to arbitration. JON MARTIN TROLLDALEN, INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 20 (1993). Neither the Permanent Court of
Arbitration nor any other arbitral body has been proposed as a forum for the resolution of
trade-environment conflicts.
215. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 92, 93; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
(1945) [hereinafter ICJ STATUTE]. For an overview of the history and workings of the Court,
see SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1973).
The Court has, in addition to the power to decide contentious cases between states, the
authority to render advisory opinions. ICJ STATUTE, supra, art. 65. The United Nations Security
Council and the General Assembly are authorized to request such opinions. U.N. CHARTER, art.
96. The General Assembly can also authorize other organs of the U:N. and specialized agencies
to request advisory opinions. Id. Many of the impediments to the adjudication of international
environmental disputes outlined below apply with equal force to requests for advisory opinions.
216. As a Judge and the President of the ICJ told the UNCED Conference, "there is no
legal question or problem concerning the environment over which the ICJ does not have full
jurisdiction and competence ratione materiae." Sir Robert Jennings, The Role of the ICJ in the
Development of International Environment Protection Law, reprinted in 22 ENVTL. POL. & L.
312, 313 (1992).
217. See, e.g., EXPERT'S GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (1986);
WCED, supra note 1, at 334; Lawrence Susskind & Connie Ozawa, Negotiating More Effective
International Environmental Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 2, at 165;
Catherine Tinker, "Environmental Security" in the United Nations: Not A Matter for the
Security Council, 59 TENN. L. REV. 787, 801 (1992) (International community "would be better
served by urging nations ... to take complaints to the ICJ when legal duties are breached or
treaty obligations broken."); UNA/SIERRA CLUB, UNITING NATIONS FOR THE EARTH 16-17
(1990); James Cameron & Durwood Zaelke, Global Warming and Climate Change-An




jurisdiction of the Court in these matters. 21 8 The Court has repeatedly
"declared its willingness and readiness to deal with such cases fully and
promptly. 21 9 Indeed, to "be prepared to the fullest extent to deal with any
environmental cases falling within its jurisdiction," the Court recently
formed a special seven-member Chamber for Environmental Matters.220
Although the Court can play a useful role in the adjudication of
transboundary pollution cases, in disputes involving the interpretation of
an environmental treaty, and in various bilateral environmental disputes,22 1
218. Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nation Conference on Environment
and Development, para. 152, reprinted in 2 AGENDA 21, supra note 93, at 733-34.
219. WCED, supra note 1, at 334.
220. The Court's statute provides that "[t]he Court may from time to time form one or
more chambers, composed of three of more judges as the Court may determine, for dealing
with particular categories of cases; for example, labour cases and cases relating to transit and
communications." ICJ STATUTE, supra note 215, art. 26, para. I. The Chamber for Environ-
mental Matters is composed of Judges Schwebel, Bejdaoui, Evensen, Shahabuddeen,
Weeramantry, Ranjeva, and Herczegh, who were elected by secret ballot. World Court Sets-Up
Special Environmental Chamber, Reuter Lib. Rep., July 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File. The formation of such an Environmental Chamber had long been
urged. See, e.g., P.C. Jessup, Do New Problems Need New Courts?, 65 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ASIL 261-68 (1971); Manfred Lachs, The Revised Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, at 21, 43
(Kalshoven ed., 1980); Manfred Lachs, Some Reflections on the Settlement of International
Disputes, 68 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL 323-30 (1974). To date, this new Chamber has not
been used.
The Court's statute also provides that "[tihe Court may at any time form a chamber
dealing with a particular case." ICJ STATUTE, supra note 215, art. 26, para. 2. See generally
EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, 221 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,
106-22 (1990); Steven Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1987); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT (1965).
Unlike the specialized Environmental Chamber, ad hoc chambers have been used on a
number of occasions. See, e.g., Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July
15); Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1988
I.C.J. 66 (Oct. 14); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
Presumably, an environmental dispute could be submitted to an ad hoc chamber of the Court.
221. The Court is seized of a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia regarding the
construction of the Gab~fkovo dam and the diversion of the Danube River. In 1977, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia entered into a treaty providing for the construction and joint operation of
the Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System. Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation
of the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Sept. 16, 1977, Czech.-Hung., 1109 U.N.T.S.
235, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1247 (1993). Under this agreement, the nations were to build a
dam, a reservoir, a barrage system, two hydroelectric stations, and a twenty-five kilometer
bypass canal to divert the Danube through a system of locks. Id.
In 1989, in response to public pressure, Hungary suspended construction on the project.
Shortly thereafter, Hungary terminated the treaty. Hungarian Declaration on the Termination
of the Treaty on the Construction and Joint Operation of the Gabfkovo-Nagymaros Barrage
System, 32 I.L.M. 1259 (1993). Czechoslovakia then pursued a "provisional solution" involving
the unilateral diversion of the Danube that allegedly caused environmental harm to Hungary.
After extensive negotiations, the parties agreed to submit this dispute to the ICJ. Special
Agreement for the Submission to the International Court of Justice of the Differences Between
Czechoslovakia and Hungary Concerning the Gabkovo-Nagymaros Project, April 7, 1993,
Czech.-Hung., 32 I.L.M. 1293 (1993). For more on this action, see Philippe J. Sands, Reports
from International Courts and Tribunals, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 495, 498 (1992); Paul R.
Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Dispute Between Slovakia and
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a marked increase in the use of the ICJ to resolve global environmental
conflicts is unlikely. As explained more fully below, there are substantial
political, doctrinal, and structural impediments to international environ-
mental adjudication. These impediments suggest that adjudication will not
and should not be the international community's primary means of
resolving trade-environment conflicts.22
B. Adjudication of International Environmental
Disputes: Political Impediments
International law imposes no obligation on a state to submit a dispute
with another state to international adjudication. 3 Thus, unlike domestic
tribunals, international courts do not possess compulsory jurisdiction.
Rather, jurisdiction exists only by consent of the disputing parties.2 24 As
Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabilkovo and Nagymaros Dams, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL L. 1 (1994).
In addition, the Court recently received a request for an advisory opinion from the WHO
that stated "[i]n view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons
by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law
including the WHO Constitution?" Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict, 1993 I.C.J. 93 (Sept. 13).
Opinions addressing the merits in either of these proceedings could greatly advance the
development of international environmental law. Thus, the argument to follow does not deny
the ICJ's ability to develop and clarify the rules of international environmental law. See, e.g.,
SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 4-5 (1958) (suggesting that the ICJ's primary utility is in its capacity to
develop international law, rather than in its role as a dispute settlement body). Rather, this
argument suggests that the ICJ is unlikely to play a role in the resolution of a significant num-
ber of the myriad trade-environment disputes that the international community will face.
222. For more on the resolution of international environmental disputes generally, see
Richard Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of International Law of the Environ-
ment, in 144 RECUEIL DES COURS 139 (1975) [hereinafter Bilder, Settlement of Disputes]. The
analysis below is influenced by this seminal work, as well as Professor Bilder's other writings
on uses and limits of adjudication in international dispute resolution. See, e.g., Richard Bilder,
International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 471 (1989);
Richard Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International Adjudication, I
EMORY J. INT'L DisP. RESOL. 131 (1987); Bilder, ICJ CROSSROADS, supra note 214, at 158. See
also David A. Wirth, Book Review, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 479 (outlining certain shortcom-
ings of international environmental adjudication); Developments in the Law-International
Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1550 (1991) [hereinafter Developments:
International Environmental Law].
223. "There exists an uncontroverted principle of general international law according to
which no State is obliged to submit a dispute with another State to an international tribunal.
Such submission requires agreement of the parties to the dispute." ROSENNE, supra note 215,
at 313.
224. Nations may consent to ICJ jurisdiction in three different ways: through a special
agreement to submit a particular dispute to the Court; through a jurisdictional clause in an
international treaty to which the nation is party; or through a more general declaration accepting
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 215, art. 36.
Interestingly enough, at the San Francisco conference to consider and approve the U.N.
Charter and ICJ Statute, a majority of states favored a grant of automatic compulsory juris-
diction to the ICJ. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2491, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
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a historical matter, nations rarely consent to third party adjudication and
have tended to use the ICJ relatively infrequently.225
A number of reasons explain the failure of many nations to use the
Court more frequently. 226 Most importantly, "[t]he vast majority of
nations, especially the major world powers, have been and continue to be
unwilling to limit their sovereignty by submitting to the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction. 227 Several factors contribute to this reluctance. For
example, national officials are hesitant to permit third parties to make
final, binding determinations of their nation's interests in an international
dispute.228 "[N]ations will not adjudicate matters which, they feel, they
could not afford to lose or where, if they lost, they could not afford to
obey the judgment. ' 229 This tendency is exacerbated in issues deemed to
be of "vital importance." As the U.S. government has declared, "[c]ases
JUSTICE: SELECTED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DRAFTING OF THE STATUTE 33-45 (1946).
However, the United States and the Soviet Union adamantly opposed compulsory jurisdiction,
and this view ultimately prevailed. Summary Report of the Fourteenth Meeting qf Committee,
13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 226 (1945), IC/I, Doc. 661.
225. From 1946-1985, the ICJ rendered forty-six judgments, fifty substantive orders, and
eighteen advisory opinions, an average of approximately two or three decisions per year.
1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 194-200. Over the decades, the case load has tended to ebb and flow.
For example, from the delivery of the 1975 Advisory Opinion in the Case of the Western
Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16), until the 1976 filing of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11), there was a 10 month period when there were no
cases on the Court's docket. There were also no cases pending for nearly 6 months in 1970.
Fred L. Morrison, The Future of International Adjudication, 75 MINN. L. REV. 827, 831 n.23
(1991).
In the last few years, the size of the Court's docket has increased, although in absolute
numbers its caseload is still small. See, e.g., Keith Highet, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The
World Court in Business Again, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 646 (1991).
226. There is extensive literature on the causes of and suggested cures for the Court's
disuse. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Mark W. Janis
ed., 1992); THOMAS FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986); Bilder, ICJ CROSSROADS,
supra note 214; RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986); JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt eds., 1974); Morrison, supra note
225; J. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law and the Role of the World
Court, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 129, 142-56 (1989); Hardy Dillard, The World Court: Reflections
of a Professor Turned Judge, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 205 (1978); Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The
World Court and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 551 (1977).
227. J. Patrick Kelly, The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation, 12 YALE
J. INT'L L. 342, 365 (1987).
228. As Senator Huey Long stated during the debate on whether this nation should join
the World Court, "[W]e are being rushed in pell-mell to get into this World Court so that Sefior
Ab Jap or some other something from Japan can pass upon our controversies." 79 CONG. REC.
1132 (1935).
229. LoUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 187 (1979). As then Secretary of State
William P. Rodgers explained, "States have not been willing to accept the idea of going to the
Court on a regular basis, expecting to win some cases and lose others. If the legal adviser of
the foreign ministry is not confident of victory, he recommends against litigation." Address by
William P. Rodgers, American Society of International Law Annual Dinner, Apr. 25, 1970,
reprinted in 62 U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL. 623, 623-24 (1970).
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of secondary importance to the vital interests of States are often consid-
ered not worth the expenditure of time and money [to litigate], and cases
which do affect those vital interests are regarded as too important to
entrust to any third party."23
A related drawback is that adjudication is a zero-sum process.231
Litigation, including interstate litigation, typically produces a clear
"winner" and "loser., 232 Litigation is not designed or intended to produce
mutually acceptable solutions to disputes. For this reason, nations com-
monly prefer diplomatic mechanisms such as negotiation and compro-
mise; these are more flexible and often generate a larger universe of
alternative resolutions. As many international disputes have significant
political components, national leaders often prefer a face-saving compro-
mise over the risk of legal defeat.
The Court has also been hampered by "a perceived lack of bite.
233
Under the U.N. Charter, a nation "undertakes to comply with the deci-
sion" of the Court if "it is a party" to the case.2 34 However, on several
occasions, nations have refused to comply with Court directives. For
example, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case,235 Iran refused to obey the
ICJ's order forbidding the nationalization of a British corporation until
the Court's final judgment. Similarly, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case,236 Iceland disregarded the Court's order not to enforce a fifty mile
fishing zone pending the Court's disposition of actions filed by the U.K.
and West Germany. More recently, in the United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Teheran Case,237 Iran refused to comply with the
Court's Interim Order and Final Judgment to release U.S. citizens taken
hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Iran. Although the U.N. Security
Council has authority to "decide upon measures to be taken to give effect
230. Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 97, para. 46, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/8382
(1971). Professor Richard Baxter, before elevation to the bench of the ICJ, voiced a similar
opinion. Richard R. Baxter, Symposium: The International Court of Justice: Introduction, 11
VA. J. INT'L L. 291, 291-94 (1971).
231. Bilder, ICI CROSSROADS, supra note 214, at 170.
232. Id.
233. John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age,
81 GEO. L.J. 535, 540 (1993).
234. U.N. CHARTER, art. 94, § 1.
235. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 89 (Interim Protection Order, July
5).
236. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. & N. Ireland v. Iceland; F.R.G. v. Iceland), 1972
I.C.J. 30 (Aug. 17).
237. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7
(Interim Order, Dec. 15), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Final Judgment on the Merits, May 24).
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to the [Court's] judgment, 2 38 the Council has yet to decide upon any
enforcement measures in such situations.239
In addition, a party that wants a dispute resolved quickly will find the
Court's procedures "uninviting." 2 40 The Court is not particularly "well
adapted for fact-finding, and a long time passes before the Court renders
a decision, even with its light caseload. '24' For example, the Court took
eight years to reach a decision in the Barcelona Traction Case242 and six
years in the South West Africa243 Cases.2"
Finally, other reasons that contribute to the infrequent use of the
Court include:
a sense of ignorance and unfamiliarity about the world of law and
adjudication; ... the weakness - in many countries - of the habit
of adjudication; a lack of confidence in "foreign judges" and fear
that a court might extend its authority and the scope of law to
"strictly internal" matters; the feeling that a lawsuit is an unfriendly
act that might exacerbate relations; and that loss of a case would be
a blow to national prestige .... The issues of particular cases,
moreover, will often discourage its adjudication. A nation will not
normally come to court where its case is weak and its chance of
winning slim.24 5
This general reluctance to adjudicate extends to international envi-
ronmental issues. For example, although several nations were affected by
radioactive debris, no state brought suit against the Soviet Union after the
238. U.N. CHARTER, art. 94, § 2.
239. Barton & Carter, supra note 233, at 541. The only occasion on which the Security
Council's power has been invoked was when the U.K. unsuccessfully sought the Council's
support for the Court's Interim Order of protection against Iran in 1951. See D.W. Bowett,
Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes, 180 RECUEIL
DES COURS 169, 212 (1983). The President Judge of the Court has suggested that "an environ-
mental issue could well be a situation where [this power] could come into its own." Jennings,
supra note 216, at 314.
240. Barton & Carter, supra note 233, at 542.
241. Id.
242. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (BeIg. v. Sp.), 1970
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction Case].
243. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
244. The ICJ did not render a final judgment on the merits in either case. A factor related
to this delay is expense. Litigation before the ICJ is extremely expensive. For example,
litigation of the Gulf of Maine Case before a Chamber of the Court is estimated to have cost
the United States $7 million. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,
(Can. v. U.S.), 1982 I.C.J. 3 (Order for Constitution of Chamber Jan. 20), 1984 I.C.J. 246
(Judgment Oct. 12). See also D.R. Robinson et al., Some Perspectives on Adjudicating Before
the World Court: The Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 578, 588 (1985).
245. HENKIN, supra note 229, at 187. See also, Oscar Schachter, General Course in Public
International Law, in 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 208 (1982).
Summer 19941 1091
Michigan Journal of International Law
1985 Chernobyl accident. 246 Similarly, no international legal claims were
filed against Switzerland for damages caused by the 1986 Sandoz spill of
toxic chemicals into the Rhine river, despite possible Swiss violations of
a treaty providing for adjudication of all disputes.2 47 Although many
regional and global environmental agreements contain provisions for
arbitration or judicial settlement of disputes on an optional basis, to date
"there are no known cases in which any of these provisions were invoked
or used. 248
This reluctance to adjudicate environmental issues stems, in part,
from political considerations. At times, nations are simply unwilling to
cede decision-making authority over environmental issues to adjudicatory
bodies. Thus, for example, in 1970 Canada enacted the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act. This law raised a number of important and
complex questions regarding then unsettled doctrines of the international
law of the sea.249 However, the Canadian government excluded interna-
tional legal disputes arising out of the operation of the Act from the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction .250 Similar unilateral actions continue. For
example, Poland's recent acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdic-
tion expressly excludes cases involving "disputes with regard to pollution
of the environment .... 25
Even if jurisdiction exists, strategic calculations may dissuade a state
from pursuing adjudication of an environmental claim. In addition to the
246. See, e.g., PHILIPPE J. SANDS, CHERNOBYL: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMUNICA-
TION 26-30 (1988).
247. See Developments: International Environmental Law, supra note 222, at 1499.
Although no legal claims arising out of the Persian Gulf War have been filed with the Court,
both Kuwait and Iraq have submitted claims for compensation due to environmental damage
to the U.N. Compensation Commission. See Kuwait, Iraq Submit Rival Claims for Compensa-
tion.from Gulf War Damage, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 593 (Aug. 1, 1993).
248. 2 AGENDA 21, supra note 93, at 754.
249. Significant legal issues raised by this Act included questions regarding "the legal
regime of Arctic waters, the concept of contiguous zones, the status of waters within archipel-
agoes, and the doctrines of innocent passage and international straits." Richard B. Bilder, The
Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69
MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970).
250. Canada withdrew jurisdiction over "disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction
or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or
exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of
pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of
Canada." Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, Apr. 7, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 598, 599. This declaration was later withdrawn.
Canada: Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction with Regard to Disputes Arising out of
Jurisdictional Claims, Sept. 10, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1729.
251. ". . . unless the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice results from treaty
obligations of the Republic of Poland." Renata Szafarz, Poland Accepts the Optional Clause
of the ICJ Statute, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 374 (1991).
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foreign policy risks associated with any international'litigation, 252 a nation
that is a pollution victim may forego bringing suit because, on other
occasions, that nation may be a source of pollution. Thus, West Germany
may have refrained from pursuing international legal remedies against
Switzerland after the Sandoz spill because Germany "has been responsible
for at least as many toxic spills as Switzerland. 253 Similarly, the U.K.
may have been dissuaded from filing claims against the Soviet Union
following the Chernobyl accident because of "outstanding disputes
regarding acid rain in Scandinavia, contamination of the Irish Sea by
nuclear waste from the Windscale/Sellafield nuclear plant, and alleged
damage to Australian territory from nuclear tests carried out by the
United Kingdom in the 1950's.,,254
C. Adjudication of International Environmental Disputes: Doctrinal
and Procedural Impediments
Even if the political impediments outlined above are overcome, a
variety of doctrinal and procedural impediments remain to the adjudica-
tion of international environmental disputes. Most importantly, the
adjudication of such disputes is significantly hampered by the relatively
undeveloped state of international environmental law and by the Court's
restrictive procedural requirements.
1. Pervasive Uncertainties in the Substantive Law
"[C]ustomary international environmental law is in an embryonic state
of development, and although treaties are numerous, they provide only
islands of rules in a sea of vague general principles and custom., 255 As
a result, parties are unable to predict, with any degree of certainty, the
substantive law that would be applied to, or the outcome of, a potential
international environmental adjudication.
For example, the general principle governing international environ-
mental responsibility is relatively clear: "States have ... the responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdictions or control do not
252. See e.g., Steven C. McCaffrey, Private Remedies for Transfrontier Pollution Damage
in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Study, 19 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 35 (1981).
253. Aaron Schwabach, Note, The Sandoz Spill: The Failure of International Law to
Protect the Rhine from Pollution, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 470 (1989).
254. Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 393, 406 (1989).
255. Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of International Environmental Disputes in
the Context of Canada-United States Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of Techniques and
Mechanisms, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 247, 252 (1986).
Summer 19941 1093
Michigan Journal of International Law
cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction." '56 However, the scope of this responsi-
bility is ill-defined. The principal problem arises from the juxtaposition
of this responsibility and the apparently contradictory "sovereign right"
of nations "to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental policies." '257 Harmonizing these two principles legally has proven
to be frustratingly elusive. As a group of legal experts convened by the
U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) concluded, "an obligation to
protect the environment exist[s] in international law, but ... its content
[is] not established.
258
Moreover, a number of important subsidiary questions remain
unanswered. Most significantly, substantial debate continues as to whether
this principle imposes a strict liability or a fault based standard on
States.259 Although a handful of international environmental treaties
expressly address liability issues,26 this topic is so contentious that
several international environmental treaties simply avoid any determina-
tion of whether a breach of the treaty entails liability.261 A great many
other treaties neatly sidestep the question of liability by providing that the
256. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 43, prin. 21.
257. Id. This sovereign right "is understood in the context as a code for each nation's right
to do with its environment whatever it wishes, without having to answer for its internal effects
internationally." STONE, supra note 29, at 35.
258. Report of the Group of Experts on Liability for Pollution and Other Environmental
Damage and Compensation for Such Damage, U.N. Doc. UNEPIWG.818, at 4 (1977).
259. See, e.g., Thomas Gehring & Markus Jachtenfuchs, Liability for Transboundary
Environmental Damage: Towards A General Liability Regime?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 92 (1993);
Sanford E. Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Environmental Liability: Can
Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311 (1989);
ALLEN SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 130-34 (1983); BIRNIE & BOYLE,
supra note 3, at 139-49. Some argue that a strict liability standard is simply impractical given
the widespread nature of transborder pollution, and that adoption of this standard would have
"to be offset by raising the threshold of what constitutes a legally actionable level of 'damage'
or by putting the complainant under a stronger burden to prove that the defendant's activities
were the cause of its injuries." STONE, supra note 29, at 63.
260. For example, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45, provides for the establishment of
an oil pollution compensation fund, and for limited liability of shipowners without a showing
of fault; however, as a result of this provision, not a single nation has ratified this treaty. 3
AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 1503 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1992).
Nations have accepted the principle of strict liability in the context of damage caused by
space objects. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 188. A strict liability provision is also found in the
treaty between Argentina and Uruguay regarding the La Plata River. Treaty Concerning La
Plata River and its Maritime Limits, Nov. 19, 1973, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
261. See, e.g., Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, opened for signature Sept. 26, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1377; Convention on
Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature Nov. 13, 1979, reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1442; C.I.T.E.S., supra note 108.
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parties will cooperate in the future to establish rules and procedures on
liability and damages.262 Similarly, UNEP's efforts to develop rules
"concerning the responsibility of states and indemnification of victims of
transfrontier pollution ... [have been] unsuccessful. '263 Most recently, at
the Earth Summit, it was impossible to reach consensus on liability rules;
the international community could do no more than call upon states to
''cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop
further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse
effects of environmental damage ... to areas beyond their jurisdiction. 2 6
Likewise, it is unresolved whether transboundary environmental
damage must reach a certain level of gravity before it becomes imper-
missible under international law. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law provides that nations are responsible "for any significant
injury" to areas beyond national jurisdiction resulting from activities
within its jurisdiction or control.265 Other legal instruments have required
262. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Interna-
tional Lakes, opened for signature Mar. 17, 1992, art. 7, reprinted in 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L.
703, 708 ("[t]he Parties shall support appropriate international efforts to elaborate rules, criteria
and procedures in the field of responsibility and liability"); Convention on Control of Hazard-
ous Waste, supra note 122, art. 12; Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources of
the Environment of the South Pacific, opened for signature Nov. 25, 1986, art. 20, reprinted
in 26 I.L.M. 41, 49 (parties to cooperate in future to formulate liability rules); Convention for
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
opened for signature Mar. 24, 1983, art. 14, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 227, 231; Convention on
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 13, 1972,
art. 10, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1294, 1302 (parties "undertake to develop procedures for
assessment of liability"). See also Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents, opened for signature Mar. 17, 1992, art. 13, reprinted in 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L.
722, 729 (1992); Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 28,
at 1451 ("the Parties undertake to elaborate rules and procedures relating to liability for damage
arising from activities taking place in the Antarctic Treaty area and covered by this Protocol");
Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, opened for signature Jan. 29, 1991, art. 12,
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 775, 790 ("Conference of the Parties shall set up an ad hoc expert organ
to prepare a draft Protocol setting out appropriate rules and procedures in the field of liabilities
and compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous
waste").
263. ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 62
(1991).
264. Rio Declaration, supra note 43, prin. 13. Even where clear liability rules have been
articulated, they generally have not served to eliminate the underlying environmental problem.
See, e.g., Alexandre Kiss, The Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, 25 NAT. RES. J. 613
(1985) (arguing that liability rules cannot prevent pollution and outlining reasons why such
rules would not work at an interstate level).
265. The Restatement provides that:
[a] state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent
practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction
or control . . . are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment
of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
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that the injury be "substantial" or "serious." 266 In addition to this question
of the relevant standard, substantial questions exist regarding the type of
interests that are protected. Does international environmental law concern
itself only with the "physical consequences" of transborder environmental
damage or with economic and social effects as well?267 What of damage
to the environment itself that does not constitute a loss of property?
268
Finally, to whom should compensation be given when the injury is to
global commons resources?
The law on state attribution is likewise unfixed. 269 Although nations
may be held responsible for the acts or omissions of state organs and
agencies, international pollution is often generated by private entities.
There is substantial uncertainty regarding the responsibility of nations to
regulate the environmental consequences resulting from the conduct of
private citizens, domestic corporations, and multinational corporations.270
Given the paucity of cases, the circumstances under which an interna-
tional tribunal would attribute the acts of such parties to the state is an
271open question.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 601(l)(b)
(1987). The Restatement further provides that a state that is "responsible to another state for
violation [of the above-quoted provision] is subject to general interstate remedies ... to
prevent, reduce, or terminate the activity threatening or causing the violation, and to pay
reparation for injury caused." Id., § 602.
266. See id., § 601, n.3.
267. See, e.g., BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 3, at 100. Recent International Law Commis-
sion drafts examining "international liability for injurious consequences arising from acts which
are not prohibited under international law" focus on "physical consequences" only. Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fortieth Session, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 11, 25. See also Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Development: The Fortieth
Session of the International Law Commission, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 153 (1989).
268. See Sands, supra note 254, at 407; SPRINGER, supra note 259, at 136-37. There is
significant debate concerning the effect of the Trail Smelter arbitration award on this issue.
Trail Smelter Arbitration (Can. v. U.S.), 13 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1949). Compare Alfred Rubin,
Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV. 259, 273 (1971) (Trail
Smelter precludes "international responsibility ... for acts of pollution not giving rise to
tangible monetary injury") with GUnther Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of
Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 62-63 (1975) (arguing for broader set of
compensable interests).
Developments in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war may shed light on this issue. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687, establishing the cease fire, permits claims for injuries to the
environment arising out of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. U.N. Sec. Coun. Res.
687, adopted April 3, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847. ("Iraq ... is liable under international
law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources .... ).
269. See, e.g., SPRINGER, supra note 259, at 128-29.
270. See, e.g., McCaffrey, supra note 267.
271. See, e.g., BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
30 (1988) (urging attribution where state acts in "central role" in a commercial enterprise).
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Finally, a successful litigant will likely receive inadequate relief.
International tribunals rarely grant injunctive relief or punitive damages. 72
Likewise, compensation may not be awarded for environmental damage
that does not constitute a loss of property.
27 3
There is little doubt that the lack of well-defined legal standards and
the inadequacy and uncertainty of relief act as substantial bars to adjudi-
cation of international environmental issues. "In a subject where legal
rules are still developing, and underlying consensus not yet fully estab-
lished, the role of adjudication is likely to be limited. 274 The substantial
uncertainty regarding the relevant legal norms is, to a certain extent, self-
perpetuating. Just as the numerous unanswered legal questions contribute
to the reluctance to bring such cases to the Court, the lack of environ-
mental cases affords the Court little opportunity to clarify the law in this
area.275 These doctrinal impediments make it unlikely that adjudication
will become the international community's preferred mechanism for the
resolution of trade-environment conflicts.
2. Procedural Impediments to International
Environmental Adjudication
Environmental adjudication in the ICJ has likewise been hampered by
certain procedural doctrines. The most significant of these is the Court's
stringent standing requirements.
Many contemporary international environmental issues - including
many trade-environment conflicts - involve harm to shared or global
commons resources. This phenomenon raises the legal issue of whether
any particular nation has standing to complain of such harm. Cases
involving harm to global commons resources arguably involve a breach
of international obligations erga omnes which "[b]y their very nature...
are the concern of all States. 276 The ICJ has indicated that, with respect
272. See, e.g., Lusitania Case (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 32, 40 (1926) ("[C]ounsel has
failed to point us to any money award by an international arbitral tribunal where exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages have been assessed against one sovereign nation in favor of
another."); BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 3, at 150-51 (suggesting that the ICJ "cannot grant
injunctions or prohibitory orders restraining violations of international law"); CHRISTINE GRAY,
JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69-74 (1987) (punitive damages generally not
awarded). But see I'm Alone Case (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1609, 1618 (1933, 1935)
(awarding $25,000 as "material amend in respect of the wrong" suffered by Canada).
273. STONE, supra note 29, at 63.
274. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 3, at 184.
275. Leo Gross, Conclusions, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 727, 746 (Leo Gross ed., 1976). See also RICHARD BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (1981).
276. Barcelona Traction Case, supra note 242, at 32.
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to obligations erga omnes, "all states can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection. ' 77 Nevertheless, the Court has yet to grant standing
on this basis;2 78 rather, the Court has strictly limited standing to states that
are directly injured by the acts at issue. Thus, absent a substantial change
in the Court's jurisprudence, it appears that no individual state possesses
standing to sue when environmental harm is inflicted upon a global
commons resource.7 9 For similar reasons, no state will have standing to
protect the interests of future generations28° or nonhuman species that may
be harmed by environmentally destructive practices.281
Moreover, the Court's statute provides that "[o]nly states may be
parties in cases before the Court.2 82 Nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), often the most zealous advocates of international environmental
interests, have no direct access to the Court. Entities that will be directly
affected by new environmental standards, such as private individuals and
multinational corporations, likewise have no direct access to the Court.283
277. Id. The Court has discussed the principle of obligations erga omnes in different
contexts. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (Advisory Opinion May 28) (human rights); Nuclear Tests
Cases (Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 269; 457, 474 (Judgment Dec. 20) (unilateral
undertaking addressed to entire international community).
278. A similar issue was raised in the controversial South West Africa Cases. South West
Africa Cases, supra note 243. In this consolidated action, Ethiopia and Liberia had filed suit
alleging that, in its administration of South West Africa, South Africa had violated obligations
due to the international community as expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations and
the Mandate Agreement. Both Ethiopia and Liberia had been members of the League of
Nations. Nevertheless, over strong dissents by Judge Jessup and Judge Tanaka, the Court
concluded that these nations lacked standing to raise these issues because neither their own
interests, nor those of their nationals, were affected. Id. at 388 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Jessup); id., at 252 (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka).
For a further discussion of the concept of erga omnes obligations, see Schachter, supra
note 245, at 195-202. See also EDWARD MCWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND THE CONTEM-
PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING PROCESS 17 (1979); Fredrick Kirgis, Standing to Chal-
lenge Human Endeavors that Could Change the Climate, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1990).
279. But see Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies for Environmental Damage to the
World's Common Spaces, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 149
(Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991) (arguing international law provides limited
remedies to nations when environmental harm occurs in global common areas).
280. See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY & INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989).
281. The seminal discussion of issues raised by the question of standing for non-human
species is in CHRISTOPHER STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING: TOWARDS LEGAL RIGHTS
FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (1984). An interesting, recent application of Stone's arguments is found
in Sudhir Chopra & Anthony D'Amato, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 21 (1992).
282. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 25, art. 34. This limitation also applies to cases heard
before Chambers of the Court.
283. See generally Kiss & Shelton, supra note 263, at 40, 49; PAUL GROMLEY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 48-50 (1976);
David Scott Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-States in International
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Many have argued that environmental NGOs, in particular, should be
permitted to appear before the Court.2 4 These organizations "have the
resources, the energy and the interest to participate in the international
legal process, and unlike governments are not hindered by often extrane-
ous politically self-interested considerations in determining whether to
invoke the law. 28 5 Even Judge Jessup, a strong advocate of international
environmental adjudication before the Court, recognized the "folly" of
hearing such disputes without input from "those entities which will be as
much concerned with enforcement of the new [environmental] standards
as will governments of States. 286
However, giving NGOs the right to appear as parties before the Court
would require a significant, and unlikely, revision of the ICJ Statute.
Given the significant diversity in the international environmental NGO
281 ~ ascommunity, it would also raise the possibility of multiple environmen-
tal parties and intervenors advocating conflicting positions.288
"[P]ermitting multiple claimants may render settlement of a dispute more
difficult or lead to measures disproportionate to the violation or injury. 28 9
In addition to standing, other procedural doctrines can hinder adjudi-
cation of international environmental issues. The Nuclear Tests Cases
illustrate how this can occur. In this consolidated action, Australia and
New Zealand claimed that they were suffering the effects of radioactive
fallout resulting from France's nuclear testing in the atmosphere over the
Pacific.29 Plaintiffs also argued that the tests violated international law
Environmental Law, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 475 (1992). In contrast, domestic environmental
law often provides access to interested individuals and groups. See JEFFREY G. MILLER &
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987), and other international tribunals permit NGOs to file
actions. BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 142, 160-61 (Simone Bilderbeek ed., 1992)
(International Water Tribunal permits NGOs to bring cases against States).
NGOs and private citizens likewise have no means of ensuring indirect access to the
Court, as States are under no international legal obligation to press their citizens' claims before
an international tribunal.
284. Sands, supra note 254, at 412; Comment, Resolving International Environmental
Disputes Between Private Parties and States, I EMORY J. INT'L Disp. RESOL. 81, 96 (1986).
See also Kirgis, supra note 278, at 25; John T. Miller, Jr., Intervention in Proceedings Before
the International Court of Justice, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, supra note 275, at 550.
285. Sands, supra note 254, at 411-12.
286. Jessup, supra note 220, at 210.
287. The recent NAFTA debate provides a well-publicized example of the divergent NGO
views on trade-environment issues. See, e.g., Environmental Groups Line Up to Oppose,
Support Trade Pact, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Sept. 16, 1993).
288. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 3, at 157.
289. Id.
290. Nuclear Tests Cases, supra note 277, at 253, 257. For a critique of the Court's
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because they caused pollution of the South Pacific, a global commons
area.29' The cases posed important questions regarding state responsibility
for transborder pollution.
However, France refused to litigate this issue. The French argued that
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. After these jurisdictional
objections were rejected, France refused to appear before the Court.292
The Court issued an Interim Order of protection, which France ignored. 3
Thereafter, France announced that it would halt its atmospheric testing of
nuclear weapons. Relying on these unilateral declarations, the Court
declared the case moot. 294 The Court thus never reached the merits of
plaintiffs' claims.295
In short, the substantial limitations on the ability to pursue claims
based on damage to community interests create serious impediments to
the adjudication of international environmental conflicts.
D. Adjudication of International Environmental
Disputes: Structural Impediments
Although it might be possible to overcome the political and doctrinal
impediments to the adjudication of international environmental disputes,
there are a series of deeper and more significant impediments. These
impediments, which result from the particular nature of international
environmental issues, render such issues peculiarly unamenable to judicial
resolution.
handling of this action, see TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND
SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 100-18 (1983); Alfred Rubin, The International Legal Effects
of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1977).
291. Nuclear Tests Cases, supra note 277, at 103-04.
292. See Notification Received Jan. 10, 1974, 907 U.N.T.S. 129.
293. See Jerome B. Elkind, French Nuclear Testing and Article 41-Another Blow to the
Authority of the Court?, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 40-41 (1974); W.K. Ris, Jr., Comment,
French Nuclear Testing: A Crisis for International Law, 4 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111,
111-12 (France began new series of atmospheric tests barely one month after the ICJ
judgment).
294. Nuclear Tests Cases, supra note 277, at 472-78. For more on the holding that a
party's unilateral declarations may be binding, compare Thomas Franck, Word Made Law: The
Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Cases, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 612 (1975) with Rubin,
supra note 290.
295. In dissent, Judge de Castro addressed the argument that nuclear testing violated a
state's obligation not to use its territory for acts contrary to the rights of other states. Nuclear
Tests Cases, supra note 277, at 389. For a criticism of the Court's failure to address the
substantive issues presented in its cases, see John Dugard, The Nuclear Tests Cases and the
South West Africa Cases: Some Realism About the International Judicial Decision, 16 VA. J.
INT'L L. 463 (1976).
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First, international environmental issues often do not present the sort
of "bilateral" dispute that is well-suited for adjudication. The "polluters"
in the case of climate change or ozone depletion for example, include all
the nationsof the earth. All nations would likewise be potential plaintiffs,
because all are affected. It would be impossible to prove the harms
caused by any particular state and nearly as difficult to collect awards
from over 170 nations. Traditional litigation simply does not lend itself
to the resolution of this type of dispute.296
However, the problem involves more than simply the number of
parties involved. The core structural impediment to adjudication is that
most global environmental issues are "polycentric" or "many centered. 297
296. This is not an argument that the Court should avoid or is incapable of resolving
disputes that have large political components. See Notification of U.S. Withdrawal, reprinted
in Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 431, 439-41 (1985) (U.S. argument that exercise of jurisdiction in
Nicaragua case represents "an overreaching of the Court's limits ... and a risky venture into
treacherous political waters"). Disputes between nations will invariably have a political
dimension. However, the Court should not decline to exercise jurisdiction over the legal aspects
of an international dispute simply because the dispute in question has other aspects. "[L]egal
disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in political contexts
and often form only one element in a wider and longstanding political dispute between the
States concerned .... [To refuse to adjudicate such disputes] would impose a far-reaching and
unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful 'solution of international
disputes." United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 237, 1980 I.C.J.,
at 20.
Rather than focus on the political-aspect of disputes, the argument is that adjudication is
not an apt method for the resolution of conflicts that involve a large number of highly
interrelated and interdependent technical and distributional issues.
297. As Lon Fuller explained:
We may visualize [a polycentric] situation by thinking of a spider web. A pull on
one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as
a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of
the resulting tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of
tensions. This would certainly occur, for example, if the doubled pull caused one or
more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a "polycentric" situation ... each
crossing of strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions.
Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395 (1979)
[hereinafter Fuller, Forms and Limits]. See also Lon Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law,
1960 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1 [hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication]; Lon Fuller, Collective
Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3 (1963) [hereinafter Fuller, Collective Bar-
gaining].
Fuller borrowed this term from Michael Polyani. See Fuller, Adjudication, supra, at 3;
Fuller, Collective Bargaining, supra, at 33 n.26. See also MICHAEL POLYANI, THE LOGIC OF
LIBERTY 170-84 (1951). The term "polycentric" is also associated with a historical narrative
technique used by Thomas Carlyle to address the fact that whereas "all Narrative is, by its
nature, of only one dimension," in actual history "every single event is the offspring not of one,
but of all other events, prior or contemporaneous, and will in its turn combine with all others
to give rise to new." Thomas Carlyle, On History, in COMPLETE WORKS, at 88-89 (H.D. Trail
ed., vol. 27 1901); PHILIP ROSENBERY, THE SEVENTH HERO 76 (1974); JOHN ROSENBERG,
CARLYLE AND THE BURDEN OF HISTORY 44 (1985).
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In addition to a multiplicity of actors, these issues generally present a
number of complex, interrelated problems. A complex interrelationship
is created between "the processes involved and the resultant impacts, the
often multiple-source and cumulative causes, and the effective solu-
tions., 298 As a result, the resolution of any one particular issue often has
vast spillover effects.
In addition, international environmental issues typically involve
complicated questions at the edges of our scientific knowledge and
technological capabilities. Uncertainty about central underlying facts may
hinder the principled adjudication of particular conflicts in several ways.
For example, states may recognize a shared level of risk but lack
sufficient information to quantify the precise level of risk they face, as in
the climate change context. Alternatively, limited factual knowledge can
lead to substantial uncertainty over the most effective policy response to
a recognized threat. Thus, nations may recognize that overfishing may
endanger a marine fishery but be unable to quantify or allocate the
maximum level of sustainable catch. Finally, new technologies, such as
auto emission systems or fishing nets, can significantly alter the environ-
mental impact of a particular activity.
In short, rapidly changing scientific knowledge often suggests new
understandings of and technological approaches to global ecological
problems. Developing technological capacities in turn strongly affect our
ability to engage in environmental destruction and environmental protec-
tion. Courts are ill-equipped to choose from among a number of con-
flicting scientific explanations of a particular global environmental
phenomenon. This significant scientific uncertainty often invites conflict-
ing interpretations and enlarges the policy component of any particular
dispute. 299 Courts often lack both the fact-finding abilities and specialized
expertise necessary to resolve disputes in subject areas marked by rapidly
developing science and technological change.3°°
298. Cooper, supra note 255, at 251.
299. Id.
300. Questions regarding the Court's ability to handle complex scientific and environ-
mental issues are not wholly speculative. One of the U.S.'s legal advisers in the Gulf of Maine
Case complained that "the marine environment is ... too complex for international courts to
come to grips with." Id. at 263 (quoting David Colson, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department
of State).
The Court can seek outside assistance with scientific or technical issues. The Court can
request that "an individual, body ... or other organization" carry out an inquiry or render an
expert opinion. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 25, art. 50. Unfortunately, this power has rarely been
exercised. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 132 (2d ed. 1991). For
example, in the Gulf of Maine Case, a Chamber of the Court did engage a technical expert. The
expert's report did not assist the Chamber in reaching its decision; rather, the Chamber
implemented the decision by means of a technical description. Cooper, supra note 255, at 260.
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In addition, global environmental issues typically present acute and
contentious distributional issues. As the negotiations over, for example,
ozone depletion, climate change, and biodiversity illustrate, global
environmental issues turn, in large part, on disputes regarding who should
pay for what. Given the lack of controlling legal principles in this area,
courts would have difficulty generating principled responses to these
distributional issues.
The difficulties associated with adjudication of polycentric disputes
are particularly salient in trade-environment conflicts. Given the interde-
pendence of the global economy and the global ecosystem, trade-
environment issues are irreducibly polycentric. The use or discontinuance
of trade measures have economic, social, and ecological spillover effects
that courts cannot easily determine. They also involve issues on the
frontiers of science. Finally, they have strong distributional elements; a
decision to uphold or strike an environmental trade measure, such as the
U.S. ban on Mexican tuna, is in large part a decision over who will bear
the costs of environmental protection (or degradation). 301 These features
combine to make trade-environment conflicts uniquely unsuited for
adjudication. 3°
The conclusions of a U.N. study of international environmental issues
can be easily applied to trade-environment conflicts:
[Environmental] problems frequently resemble traffic jams more
than automobile accidents: there are many participants rather than
just one or two; the cause of the problem lies in the individual
decisions of these many to do what, except for the existence of so
many others, might be acceptable rather than in a single error or
unlawful act; and there often exist thresholds below which no
problem would exist. Traffic lights, rules of the road, tolls and many
other means of control that do not require the assignment of respon-
sibilities may not work well, but they are surely more useful in
controlling traffic than the imposition of liability on each driver for
lost time and frayed nerves caused to others.30 3
Under Article 30, the Court can also appoint "assessors," presumably individuals with
specialized technical competence, to participate in the Court's deliberations. ICJ STATUTE,
supra note 215, art. 30. However, this authority has never been invoked.
301. As a general principle, a nation should not be permitted to transfer the costs of its
pollution to other nations. See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration, supra note 43, prin. 21. Trade-
environment conflicts raise, in part, the issue of whether a nation can transfer the costs of its
environmental protection policies to other nations. See, e.g., Dunoff, supra note 25, at 1406-07.
302. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 297, at 400.
303. UNITAR, International Co-operation for Pollution Control, RESEARCH REPORTS 9
1972, at 25, U.N. Sales No. E.75.XV.RR/9, quoted in AIDA LUISA LEVIN, PROTECTING THE
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 29 (1977).
Summer 1994] 1103
Michigan Journal of International Law
Some may argue that this article has overstated the "polycentric"
elements of trade-environment disputes or the relative polycentricity of
such disputes when compared with other international disputes. In
essence, the argument is that since other types of international disputes,
such as investment disputes or boundary disputes that have polycentric
elements, are amenable to adjudication, trade-environment disputes should
be as well.
International environmental issues differ in significant ways from
other international issues, which are often defined and limited by notions
of state sovereignty. 3°4 This concept, which is one of the cornerstones of
international law, is particularly inappropriate in the international envi-
ronmental area; natural ecosystems and pollution alike do not respect
national boundaries or the commands of sovereigns.305 The trade-envi-
ronment complex of issues is unlike other environmental issues. While
other international environmental issues, such as climate change,
biodiversity loss, and deforestation, are surely complex and difficult at
least the issues are clearly defined.
Trade on the other hand, cuts across all th[ese] problems: it plays
a central role in deforesting Malaysia and accelerating extinctions of
plants and animals in Costa Rica. It exacerbates climate change by
increasing the energy requirements of goods transported over long
distances.... [Trade-environment issues are] a political minefield
that reaches into virtually every country, industry and ecosystem.
306
The claim that trade-environment disputes are polycentric is not
equivalent to a claim that courts are absolutely incapable of addressing
them. Rather, it supports an argument that they are ill-suited to doing so.
To borrow Fuller's example, a sledgehammer is well suited to driving
stakes and will serve in a pinch for cracking nuts, but can be considered
useless when it comes to opening cans. 3°7 However, if the need is great
enough, where any solution is preferable to no solution at all, a sledge-
304. Sovereignty refers to the basic legal status of a nation that is not subject, within its
territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign nation or to
foreign law other than public international law. Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1987).
305. For more on the relationship between international environmental issues and state
sovereignty, see Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts, supra note 43.
306. HILARY F. FRENCH, COSTLY TRADEOFFS: RECONCILING TRADE AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 5 (1993).
307. Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 297, at 1.
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hammer can be used to open cans. However, the result may be exceed-
ingly messy.3 °8
Adjudication can likewise be used to provide some kinds of responses
to even the most polycentric problems. The point is that courts, like
sledgehammers, can effectively solve a limited set of problems. A rough
proportionality principle is at work here; the more polycentric the dispute,
the less equipped the courts are to resolve it.
30 9
Polycentric elements are, no doubt, present in almost all problems
resolved by adjudication. The issue is one of degree; "it is a question of
knowing when the polycentric elements have become so significant that
the proper limits of adjudication have been exceeded., 310 For the reasons
set out above, this article argues that trade-environment disputes stretch
these limits beyond their breaking points.31'
But even apart from their polycentric aspects, international environ-
mental disputes are generally ill-suited for adjudication. As a result of
changing conditions, global environmental issues often require continuous
monitoring, ongoing management, and periodic recalibration of policies
and responses. This presents a mismatch between the nature of the issues
and the nature of adjudication. International tribunals typically do not
engage in the sort of ongoing monitoring and management that global
environmental issues require, and these issues typically do not lend
themselves to the "all or nothing" solution that adjudication can
provide.3"'
There are other shortcomings to international litigation. Much litiga-
tion, including international litigation, is eventually settled out of Court.
3 13
308. Id.; James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1539 (1973).
309. Henderson, supra note 308, at 1539. Conversely, as Professor Henderson noted,
requiring courts to address polycentric disputes poses threats to the integrity of the adjudicative
process. Id. (sensible resolutions of polycentric disputes bear little, if any, relation to the legal
issues presented).
310. Fuller, Form and Limits, supra note 297, at 398.
311. To say that a dispute is polycentric, and therefore not easily amenable to adjudication,
is not to say that it defies rational solution. Id. at 388-89. Adjudication is, of course, simply
one type of dispute resolution process. Other processes are well suited to solving polycentric
problems. Diplomacy and negotiations, as urged below, are among the most frequently used
techniques for resolving polycentric problems of resource allocation. Id. at 399-400.
312. Cooper, supra note 255, at 262.
313. See, e.g., Passage through the Green Belt (Fin. v. Den.) 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sept. 10)
(discontinuation of case following settlement by the parties). This is true for environmental
disputes as well. For example, after the Court determined the admissibility of the complaint in
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.) 1992 I.C.J. 240 (Preliminary Objections,
Judgment June 26), the parties reached an out-of-court settlement. For more on Nauru's claims,
see Antony Anghie, The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445 (1993).
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In a world of bilateral litigation, "one nation's pollution complaint is
likely to be settled by reference to its neighbor's own pollution complaint
- plus a few items of contention the diplomats regard as more pressing:
trade, currency, and military assistance. 314 However, the settlement any
two states may reach regarding a particular international environmental
problem may be wholly inadequate from the perspective of other nations
who are not parties to the litigation but who are affected by the activities
of the litigants.31 5 Thus, if two nations resolve a transfrontier pollution
problem by mutually agreeing to dump their wastes in the high seas, the
dispute may be settled but hardly in a manner that advances the interests
of the international community.
316
Finally, the adversarial nature of international adjudication is most
successful when addressing situations where an alleged violation of
international law has already taken place and environmental injury has
resulted. However, international environmental law has focused less on
compensating for past wrongs than on preventive and protective mecha-
nisms. As this area of the law strives to prevent the environmental harm
in the first place, the proper focus ought to be on dispute avoidance rather
than dispute settlement.
E. A New Court for the Environment?
The combined force of the factors outlined above has produced an
almost barren history of international environmental adjudication, with
little prospect for dramatic change. Implicitly acknowledging this reality,
a number of scholars and politicians have called for new adjudicatory
institutions and, in particular, for a new International Court for the
Environment.3 7
Perhaps the most detailed and influential of these proposals was made
at the International Congress convened at the National Academy of Lincei
314. STONE, supra note 29, at 64.
315. Id.
316. Bilder, Settlement of Disputes, supra note 222, at 163.
317. See, e.g., TROLLDALEN, supra note 214, at 20; Mercosur Presidents Discuss Common
Position for June's Earth Summit, Latin Amer. Reg. Rpts., Mar. 12, 1992 available in LEXIS,
NSAMER Library, LAN File (Argentina's President supports proposal by Uruguay's President
for "an international court to deal exclusively with environmental issues"); Meeting in Mexico
Produces Call for World Environmental Court, Global Warming Network-GWN Online
Today, Sept. I6, 1991 (international meeting of environmentalists calls for formation of
international court of environment); Cameron & Zaelke, supra note 217, at 285 (calling for
creation of new International Environmental Court if ICJ does not evolve in consideration of
international environmental issues); BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 283,
at 142 (calling for environmental tribunal if ICJ does not evolve); International Environmental
Court Needed to Handle Disputes, EC Official Says, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (June 28, 1991).
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in Rome in 1989. The Congress issued a final report and recommendation
that expressly called for the creation of a "Convention" that would
"establish the principle of an individual right to the environment" and for
the establishment of "an International Court for the Environment as part
of the United Nations. 3 8 The Congress called for this Court to be open
to States and private citizens, and for the Court to "ha[ve] the power to
impose itself on all individuals and countries because it judges in the
name of the international community - i.e., for the whole of mankind
today and for future generations. 3 9
Although proposals such as this may deserve close attention, it is
unlikely that a new, international environmental court will be formed in
the near future. First, there appears to be only a small constituency that
wishes to see adjudication of international environmental disputes. The
initiative for the founding of such a court must come from the political
leaders whose freedom to maneuver would be most threatened by such
a court. 320 This is an unlikely scenario. In fact, according to a European
Parliament Deputy present at the Earth Summit, "the question of an
international, environmental court was taken off the agenda in Rio de
Janeiro because the different states rejected the idea.'
3 21
In addition to the "considerable time and effort to establish a new
court system able to handle the dynamics of environmental law, 322 there
is little reason to think that the proposed new court would avoid the
problems that have plagued the ICJ. The mere act of creating a new court
would do little to address the historical reluctance to relinquish (or appear
to relinquish) "sovereignty" by agreeing to binding third party dispute
resolution procedures by international institutions. As one leading com-
mentator concluded, "[t]he characteristic distaste of states for judicial
settlements is likely to prevail in future international environmental
regimes. 323
318. See Amedeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International Law on the Environment and
Setting Up an International Court for the Environment Within the United Nations, 20 ENVTL.
L. 321 (1990) [hereinafter Postiglione, Setting Up an ICE]. See also Amedeo Postiglione, An
International Court for the Environment?, 23 ENVTL. POL. & L. 73 (1993); Audra E. Dehan,
An International Environmental Court: Should There Be One?, 3 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 31
(1992) (endorsing the International Congress' proposal).
319. Postiglione, Setting Up an ICE, supra note 318, at 325.
320. STONE, supra note 29, at 60.
321. Parliamentarians Pledge Aggressive Action on Climate Change, Other Earth Summit
Issues, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 1, 1992).
322. TROLLDALEN, supra note 214, at 20.
323. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in
International Regulatory Regimes, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 280, 287
(Jessica Tuchman Mathews ed., 1991). See also TROLLDALEN, supra note 214, at 20.
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In addition, with respect to trade-environment disputes, the proposed
environmental world court might present a mirror image of the institu-
tional myopia that undermines attempts by the GATT or NAFTA to
resolve fairly disputes involving conflicting obligations under interna-
tional trade and environmental law. A body designed primarily to protect
environmental interests, like a body designed primarily to advance trade
interests, will be systematically biased in its consideration of disputes that
involve both trade and environmental interests.
Finally, even if the new court has liberalized standing rules and were
to announce a well developed set of rules governing legal responsibility
and liability, adjudication would still be inappropriate. Even a specialized
court would be ill-equipped to address the polycentric nature of
international environmental issues. Moreover, it is unlikely that an
adjudicatory body would possess the management authority and expertise
necessary to oversee environmental practices on a continuing basis.
This argument does not, of course, demonstrate that adjudication of
international environmental issues is never appropriate. Rather, it attempts
to outline the political, doctrinal, and structural reasons why adjudication
has not been and is unlikely to be the international community's primary
means of resolving global environmental issues. For this reason, environ-
mentalists should look toward other international fora for the resolution
of global environmental conflicts.
III. FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION
Given the inability of existing and proposed institutions to resolve
sensibly trade-environment conflicts, and the increasing frequency of such
disputes, 324 it is imperative to develop a different forum to consider these
conflicts. In calling for a new forum to consider trade-environment
disputes, this article joins others that recognize that a new and different
institution needs to emerge to "serve as an honest broker to settle disputes
324. There is widespread consensus that trade-environment conflicts are "on the rise."
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT (1991); SCHMIDHEINY, supra note 19, at 81. There is congressional concern that
elements of President Clinton's climate change action plan may be challenged as an unfair trade
barrier. See Energy Official Says Pact Would Enhance Clinton's Action Plan On Climate
Change, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Nov. 17, 1993). The E.U. is challenging U.S. fuel economy
standards as impermissible environmental trade measures. European Challenge, supra note 75.
For recent examples of such issues in the context of the European Union, see Threat of Split
in Union Looms in Talks of Packaging Directive, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 7, 1993)
(probable challenge to strict recycling laws of Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark as
inconsistent with trade provisions of the Treaty of Rome); EC Negotiators Reject Several Laws
As Stricter than Community Standards, Int'l. Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 3, 1993) (EC negotia-
tors reject several Swedish environmental laws that are more rigorous than EC laws).
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.. . [or] the response to the planet's ecological problems will remain
unfocused, ineffective and insufficient." '325
The drawbacks identified above to using trade bodies or adjudicatory
bodies to resolve trade-environment conflicts suggest a number of
institutional features that would facilitate the successful resolution of
these conflicts. 326 Trade-environment conflicts should be considered by an
institution with a mandate to further both economic and ecological
interests. These conflicts should be considered in a nonbinding forum,
using a consultation, negotiation, and consensus-building approach.
Particular trade-environment conflicts, such as the Tuna-Dolphin Panel
Report, should serve as the vehicle for a multilateral discussion of the
underlying interests at stake. Multilateral discussions over any particular
dispute would "represent not an end point, but rather a punctuation mark
in an ongoing process of negotiation. ,327
Over time, these negotiations could serve several simultaneous
purposes: to coordinate policy, progressively develop legal norms,
supervise the implementation of those norms, generate community
pressure on recalcitrant nations, and resolve international conflicts of
325. Daniel C. Esty, GATlIng the Greens, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 32, 34 (Nov./Dec. 1993).
There have been other calls for new international environmental institutions. See, e.g.,
Declaration of the Hague, Mar. 11, 1989, reprinted in 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 567
(1990); Maurice Strong, Statement as President of the World Federation of U.N. Associations
at National Conference on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Canada and the United Nations,
Halifax, Nova Scotia (June 5, 1988) (urging use of U.N. Trusteeship Council for international
stewardship of global commons areas); Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, General Debate Statement
of New Zealand Government, U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.15, at 76-77 (1989) (New Zealand proposal
for Environmental Protection Council); Maurice Bertrand, Can the United Nations Be
Reformed?, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 204-08 (H. Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury
eds., 1992) (proposal for Environmental Security Council); Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, New
Ways to Make Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992) (urging creation of
International Environmental Organization within the U.N.).
326. There is a growing body of literature discussing the establishment and implementation
of environmental regimes. See, e.g., Peter Haas, Do Regimes Matter: Epistemic Communities
and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 377 (1989); PETER SAND, LESSONS
LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (1990); GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Oran Young et al. eds., 1991); INSTITUTIONS FOR
THE EARTH, supra note 3; Winfried Lang, Diplomacy and International Environmental Law-
Making: Some Observations, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 108 (1992); Lawrence Suskind & Connie
Ozawa, Negotiating More Effective International Environmental Agreements, in INTERNATION-
AL POLITICS, supra note 2, at 142. There have also been a number of studies on environmental
conflict resolution, including Bilder, Settlement of Disputes, supra note 222. See also,
TROLLDALEN, supra note 214. The focus here, of course, is on the much narrower issue of
institutional features appropriate to an institution focusing on trade-environment conflicts.
327. Daniel Bodansky, Commentary, The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 493 (1993) (suggesting that the Climate Change
Treaty signed at the Earth Summit represents one point in an ongoing process of international
negotiation and accommodation).
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interest.32 Addressing trade-environment conflicts in a diplomatic forum
offers the promise of multilateral resolution of what are fundamentally
issues involving the entire international community.329 It also invites the
"negotiated application and development" of international environmental
standards in this area.33 Such institutions meet the international commu-
nity's needs more effectively than traditional forms of dispute resolution
and are already included in a wide variety of environmental treaties.33' In
fact, the use of bodies with features similar to those described below has
become the international community's preferred method of ensuring
compliance with environmental norms.332
In addition, many domestic environmental commissions or councils
are adopting this model. Canada, Finland, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nige-
ria, and Singapore have domestic legislation that provides for the partici-
pation of industry, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and
the scientific community in national environmental bodies. 3 3 These
commissions and councils are increasingly adopting a "consultative and
consensus-building approach" to environmental issues.334
Several institutional features would help to ensure the success of such
a body. 3 5 These features are interdependent and interact with each other
328. See generally BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 3, at 138; Alan Boyle, Saving the World?
Implementation and Enforcement of International Environmental Law Through International
Institutions, 3 J. ENVT'L. L. 229, 230 (1991); Marc A. Levy, Robert 0. Keohane & Peter M.
Haas, Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS
FOR THE EARTH, supra note 2, at 397-426 (international environmental institutions facilitate
environmental protection by raising governmental concern, providing a forum for negotiations,
monitoring national compliance, and offering technical assistance). For a somewhat similar
proposal advocating an ongoing negotiation process in the climate change context, see David
G. Victor, How to Slow Global Warming, 349 NATURE 451 (1991).
329. Boyle, supra note 328, at 230.
330. Birnie & Boyle, supra note 3, at 138.
331. Variants of the model this article proposes are used in the Montreal Protocol
noncompliance procedure. Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, Nov. 25, 1992
(creating an "Implementation Committee" of ten Parties to consider any Party's "reservations"
regarding another Party's implementation of its obligations under the Protocol). See also
Montreal Protocol, supra note 26; C.I.T.E.S., supra note 108, art. 13 (institutional measures to
follow in event of allegation that a party is not effectively implementing treaty); Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 28, art. 20 (establishing Commit-
tee for Environmental Protection, open to all Parties with access to scientific expertise, to
provide advice and formulate recommendations regarding the implementation of the Protocol).
332. Similar approaches are also used in international institutions outside of the environ-
mental context. See, e.g., Officials Agree APEC To Be Market Oriented, Consensus Group,
Int'l. Trade Daily (BNA) (Nov. 17, 1993).
333. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 230, at 9.
334. Id.
335. The list of institutional features outlined below does not address all of the institutional
questions that would face a new international institution. In particular, it would be necessary
to work out in some detail the relationship of this body to the GATT and other existing bodies
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synergistically. Reinforcing one is likely to strengthen the others, while
weakness on one front is likely to spill over on another. These features
should include the following:
A. An Institutional Mandate that Expressly Incorporates
Both Economic Development and Environmental Protection
There is a simple logic to housing trade-environment conflicts in an
institution designed to serve both interests; the policy response to a
problem should be as broad as the sources of the problem.336 It follows
that the sensible resolution of trade-environment conflicts necessarily
implicates both trade and environmental policies. Thus, the institution's
constitutive text must ensure that the resolution of environment and trade
issues occurs within a framework in which environmental concerns are
valued as highly as trade interests. The institution should seek to integrate
environmentally sustainable development and economic growth.337
The failure to have such an institutional mandate can prove fatal to
attempts to address trade-environment conflicts. As the GATT experience
demonstrates, institutions designed to advance only one of these sets of
interests cannot adequately balance the competing values implicated by
trade-environment disputes. More importantly, when policy responses
address only one of several interrelated variables, they often ignore
policies that would achieve more efficient results.338
B. Access to Impartial Scientific and Technical Expertise
One of the most striking characteristics of international environmental
law and negotiations is the critical role played by the scientific
community. 339 In trade-environment conflicts, credible scientific and
that consider international environmental issues, as well as defining the jurisdiction of this body
in relation to the jurisdiction of these other bodies. In addition, the relationship of decisions
made in the proposed body and decisions made in pre-existing bodies would need to be clari-
fied. See, e.g., Richard H. Lauwaars, The Interrelationship Between United Nations Law and
the Law of Other International Organizations, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1604 (1984). The author
intends to address these interesting and difficult issues in a subsequent publication.
336. See Richard Stewart & Jonathan Weiner, The Comprehensive Approach to Global
Climate Policy, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 91 (1992) (developing similar argument in
climate change context).
337. Agenda 21, calling for an "integration of environment and development concerns"
to produce a "better protected and managed ecosystem and a safer, more prosperous future" is
an example of such a commitment. Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. AICONF.15.1/4, paras. 1.1 (1992),
reprinted in I AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS vii (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1992)
[hereinafter I AGENDA 21]. See also Weiss, supra note 280, at 728.
338. See Stewart & Weiner, supra note 336, at 84.
339. An interesting general discussion of the role of science and scientists in international
negotiations is found in Symposium, Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination,
46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992).
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technological information is critical for several reasons. Such information
greatly facilitates an understanding of the environmental interests at stake
in any particular dispute and the likely effects of the relevant environmen-
tal trade measure. It also facilitates the formation of an effective response
to any particular conflict and the acceptability of a proposed solution to
the affected parties.
International environmental regimes3" have successfully used scien-
tific bodies to clarify similar issues on numerous occasions. For example,
longstanding disputes over the type and level of risk prevented
international agreement for some time in both the ozone depletion and
climate change negotiations. Reports by international scientific bodies
addressing these issues became authoritative statements of the environ-
mental risks faced by the global community.341 Once broad consensus on
the underlying science was reached, nations were able to reach multilat-
eral agreements in both these areas. In addition to clarifying the nature of
the risk, scientific bodies also help to identify the type or quantity of
economic activity that can occur without causing unacceptable environ-
mental damage. For example, nations have by treaty established an
International Whaling Commission 342 which has generated scientific
estimates of the sustainable yield of whale populations.343 Based upon
such estimates, the parties to the treaty agreed to limit and eventually to
halt certain forms of commercial whaling.
344
Finally, environmental regimes establish scientific bodies to keep
abreast of changing environmental conditions and scientific knowledge.
For example, the Climate Change Convention establishes a "Scientific
340. A regime is, broadly, "all sets of norms of behavior and of rules and policies which
cover any international issue, and facilitate substantive or procedural arrangements among the
States they address." S. Klein, International Regimes, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 202 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1986).
341. For authoritative scientific reports that helped frame the international debate in the
ozone depletion context, see Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts for the Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. EP/WG.78/8 (1983), at 1. In the climate
change context, the scientific reports prepared by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change served as the authoritative scientific statements regarding climate change. These reports
helped focus the debate that produced the Climate Change Convention. See, e.g., INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESS-
MENT (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT (1992).
342. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter Regulation of Whaling Convention].
343. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
344. A history of some of these efforts is recounted in Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
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and Technological Committee, 345 which is to assess the state of scientific
knowledge and provide the parties with "information on innovative,
efficient, and state-of-the-art technologies. 346 This information will
presumably enable nations to modify and update practices to ensure that
they are consistent with the objectives of the treaty.
To be useful as a tool for resolving interstate conflict, the scientific
information must be generated by an impartial scientific body. Credible
scientific data is, of course, more likely to come from international
collaborations or multilateral institutions than from unilateral assessments
produced by one of the disputing parties. "[M]any countries, especially
developing countries, simply don't trust assessments in which their
scientists and policymakers have not participated. ' 347 Thus, the institution
that considers trade-environment conflicts must have access to scientific
information generated by other multilateral bodies and the ability to
spearhead international scientific collaborations. 348 Alternatively, it may
wish to follow the model of other recent international environmental
regimes and form a standing body with scientific and technical exper-
tise.349
C. Transparent, Participatory Processes to
Enhance Institutional Legitimacy
To maximize its effectiveness, the proposed institution must structure
its activities in a way that enhances institutional legitimacy. Legitimacy,
in this context, is "a property of a rulemaking institution which itself
exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because
those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being
345. Climate Change Convention, supra note 26. An excellent analysis of this Convention
is found in Bodansky, supra note 327, at 451.
346. Climate Change Convention, supra note 26, art. 20.
347. Stephen H. Schneider, Three Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, ENV'T, Jan./Feb. 1991, at 25 (quoting Professor Bert Bolin, Chairman of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change).
348. There is solid precedent for seeking a forum with access to scientific expertise. A
number of environmental agreements provide for scientific advisory bodies that participate in
a periodic review and assessment of the treaty. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 26, art.
30; Regulation of Whaling Convention, supra note 342, art. 3.
349. The Convention on Biological Diversity establishes a Subsidiary Body on Scientific,
Technical, and Technological Advice which provides expertise regarding the implementation
of the treaty as well as scientific assessments of the status of biodiversity. Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 25, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 822, 833. The Climate Change
treaty establishes a subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice. Climate Change
Convention, supra note 26, art. 9. The Montreal Protocol provides for a Scientific Assessment
Panel to evaluate the ozone depleting potential of different substances and a Technology
Review Panel to identify state-of-the-art technologies that help reduce the use of ozone
depleting substances. Montreal Protocol, supra note 26, art. 30.
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and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right
process."35 The institution must take several practical steps to ensure
"right process" and thereby enhance the legitimacy that surrounds its
decisions.
1. Broadly Representative Membership and
Widespread Participation
As the proposed institution will be considering issues that often place
Northern tier nations at odds with Southern tier nations,35' it is imperative
that the institution avoid a perception of regional bias or of domination
by one "bloc" of nations.35 2 It should have a membership that is broadly
350. THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (emphasis
omitted). The concept of "legitimacy" has received extended analysis in the academic
international legal community in recent years. See e.g., id.; Thomas Franck, Legitimacy in the
International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988); Jose A. Alvarez, The Quest for Legiti-
macy: An Examination of the Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 199 (1991); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist Critique of Customary International Law,
33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 665, 716-27 (1986).
Rather than attempt to set forth a general account of the concept of legitimacy in the
international realm, this article presents the basic idea so as to situate the discussion that
follows.
351. This happens often, but not always. The United States and the EC have been on
opposite sides of a number of trade-environment conflicts. See, e.g., Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report
II, supra note 43 (EC challenge to U.S. tuna embargo); Werner P. Meng, The Hormone Conflict
Between the EEC and the United States Within the Context of the GATT, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L.
819 (1990) (discussing the U.S.-EC conflict over trade in beef from cattle raised with bovine
growth hormone); European Challenge, supra note 75 (EC challenge in the GATT to U.S.
automobile fuel efficiency standards).
352. To some degree, both the GATT and the ICJ suffer from the perception of regional
bias. Historically, the GATT has been perceived as a body designed primarily to further the
interests of advanced, industrialized economies. See, e.g., JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 6, at
1138-39 (outlining the reasons for the "perception among the developing countries that GATT
is a club for the rich nations, and ... although it purports to operate on a one country/one vote
principle, in fact it is an organization where the views of only a'very few major developed
nations count"); Konrad von Moltke, The Last Round: The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in Light of the Earth Summit, 23 ENVTL. L. 519, 529 (1993) ("[t]he GATT has been an
institution which reflects industrial interests first and foremost"). Indeed, as a senior U.S.
official frankly acknowledged in the context of the Uruguay Round, "[t]he big markets dictate
the trading rules .... The U.S. can't do it independently and the EC can't do it independently,
but when the two lock arms, they can determine the fate of the round." Keith Bradsher, Asians
and Latins Object to GATT Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at DI.
The ICJ likewise has suffered from allegations of regional bias, notwithstanding a structure
designed to avoid such bias. For example, all parties to the U.N. Charter are parties to the ICJ
Statute, and the composition of the ICJ bench is designed to reflect the different legal systems
of the world. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 92, 93; ICJ STATUTE, supra note 215, arts. 1-20. Neverthe-
less, for many years developing nations perceived the Court to be biased in favor of Western
interests. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication and Dispute Settlement, 23 VA. J. INT'L L.
1, 3 (1982); Ibrahaim F.I. Shihata, The Attitude of New States Towards the International Court
of Justice, 19 INT'L ORG. 203 (1965); Richard Falk, The Role of the International Court of
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reflective of the international community. It should avoid a membership
structure like that found in the consultative meetings of the Antarctic
Treaty system, which includes only those nations that benefit from the
activity or resource at issue.353 Rather, its membership should be drawn
from a wider community of nations, including not only nations whose
actions are harmful to the environment but also those with an interest in
preventing such harm. 4
Of course, membership alone is not sufficient. The institution must
actively promote widespread participation in its deliberations. The
institution must be structured to ensure that, despite differences in
resources and capabilities, all members can play meaningful roles in the
institution's various tasks. Mechanisms must be developed to give
developing nations the means and opportunity to participate appropriately
in the institution's work. For example, financial or technical assistance
can be offered to assist this participation, as is done in other international
environmental regimes.355 Institutional authority should be diffused in a
way that encourages broad participation. In addition to enhancing the
legitimacy of the institution, widespread participation will enhance the
quality of decisions reached.
A key decision, in this context, is the voting formula to be used.356
Justice, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 253 (1984); R.P. Anand, Role of the 'New' Asian-African Countries
in the Present Legal Order, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 383 (1961). More recently, actions taken by
the United States and other western nations suggest a belief that the Court is biased against
wealthy and powerful states. See, e.g., Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 244 (the United States
and Canada insisted that the case be heard by a panel of "western" judges); Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on Jurisdiction June 27) (the
United States suggested that its decision to withdraw from compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
was based, in part, on the alleged bias of the Court). See also Bilder, ICJ CROSSROADS, supra
note 214, at 168. But see Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A
Preliminary Inquiry, in ICJ CROSSROADS, supra note 214, at 123 (undertaking a quantitative
analysis of the voting records of judges in contentious cases before the Court and finding no
regional, political, or economic alignments among judges based on their voting records).
353. See Boyle, supra note 328, at 242.
354. See Boyle, supra note 328, at 233. There are precedents for this in other environ-
mental regimes as well. For example, a number of nonwhaling nations have joined the
Regulation of Whaling Convention, supra note 342, and a number of nations that do not engage
in ocean dumping are members of the London Convention. London Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 2403, 11 I.L.M. 537.
355. The international community established funds to enable developing nations to
participate fully and effectively in the Earth Summit and its preparatory processes, G.A. Res.
44/228, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Supp. No. 49, at 155, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1980), and
the Climate Change Treaty negotiating process. G.A. Res. 45/122, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
U.N. Supp. No. 48, para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990).
356. There is an extensive literature on decision-making processes in international
organizations. An excellent overview of this issue may be found in Clarence Wilfred Jenks,
Unanimity, The Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities, and Consensus as
Modes of Decisionmaking in International Organizations, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNA-
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Many environmental regimes seek to make decisions by consensus and,
if all efforts at forming a consensus have been exhausted, use a one
nation, one vote formula.357 This process is preferable to the "weighted
voting" system used by the Bretton Woods institutions, which effectively
ties voting power to wealth. In the trade-environment context,. developing
nations are unlikely to participate for an extended period in an organiza-
tion where a nation's voting power corresponds to its wealth.358 On the
other hand, industrialized nations will be reluctant to give responsibility
for trade or other economic policies to "one nation, one vote" bodies.
It is possible to develop a compromise to bridge these positions. If
consensus on a particular issue is not possible, institutional decisions
could require a majority (or supermajority) of both industrialized and
developing nation votes. A bifurcated voting scheme has been adopted by
other international environmental regimes. For example, the 1990 amend-
ments to the Montreal Protocol require parallel majorities from both
developed and developing nations.359 Similarly, decisions by the
governing council of the Global Environmental Fund, which helps
developing nations implement programs to address global environmental
issues, require a sixty percent majority of member states and a sixty
percent majority of votes "weighted" according to contributions made to
the Fund.36
Finally, institutional legitimacy can be greatly enhanced by expanding
the role NGOs may play in the process.361 In the international
TIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 48 (1965). The Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea presented a number of difficult decision-making issues. These issues,
and the formal and informal techniques used to facilitate consensus, are thoroughly discussed
in Tommy T.B. Koh & Shanmugam Jayakumar, Negotiating Process of UNCLOS II1, in 1
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 29 (Myron
H. Nordquist, ed. 1985). For more on decisionmaking in international organizations, see
FREDERIC KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 211-37 (2d ed. 1993); D.W. BOWETT, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 400-12 (4th ed. 1982).
357. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 349, art. 29 (voting
procedure on amendments); Climate Change Convention, supra note 26, art. 15 (same); Vienna
Convention, supra note 26, art. 9 (same); Montreal Protocol, supra note 26, art. 9(c) (voting
procedures on adjustments to Protocol).
358. See, e.g., Sixth Participants' Meeting of GEF Fails to Reach Accord on Major Issues,
Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 16, 1993) (industrialized nations block agreement on proposed
new voting and other procedures for Global Environmental Facility) [hereinafter Sixth Partici-
pants' Meeting].
359. London Amendments, supra note 26, at annex II, § H.
360. See Agreement Reached on Funding GEF Program to Receive More Than $1.2
Billion, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 249 (Mar. 23, 1994); Sixth Participants' Meeting, supra
note 358.
361. At the Rio Conference, the international community reaffirmed the importance of
integrating NGOs into international environmental policymaking. See, e.g., 2 AGENDA 21, supra
note 93, ch. 27 (chapter devoted to "[s]trengthening the role of non-governmental organizations:
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environmental area, the largest NGOs have resources and expertise that
are matched by only a few governments. Their participation will help to
enlarge the debate since they often advance positions different from those
of any nation or group of nations.3 62 Already a number of different
models exist for facilitating NGO participation in international environ-
mental efforts. For example, the World Heritage Convention363 confers
official status on three different NGOs. These groups are to serve as
advisors364 and are called upon "for the implementation of [treaty]
programmes and projects. 365 The United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development provided direct funding for NGO partici-
pation and adopted rules of procedure designed to facilitate NGO partici-
pation at the preparatory meetings and at the conference itself. In other
contexts, NGO representatives participate as members of national delega-
tions.366 Still other environmental regimes permit NGOs to participate
with "observer status. 367 Some combination of these different forms of
participation may be appropriate in the context of trade-environment
conflicts.
2. Transparency
Generally, institutional legitimacy is enhanced by transparent
procedures and decision-making processes. In the trade-environment
context, this requires that both Northern and Southern tier nations have
full access to the process of setting the institutional agenda and to all
institutional deliberations.
An open process for agenda setting enables "weak" nations to focus
international attention on particular issues in ways that cannot be ignored
by "stronger" nations. The capacity to influence the international agenda
Partners for sustainable development"). For more on NGOs, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of
Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of International Environmental Law, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (1993); Rubinton, supra note 283, at 475; David A. Wirth, A Match-
maker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and American Environmental Law, 32 VA. J.
INT'L L. 377, 381-83 (1992).
362. Tarlock, supra note 361, at 72.
363. Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 23, 1972,
27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1975).
364. Id., art. 8, para. 3 (advisory roles for International Center for the Study of the
Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property, the International Council of Monuments
and Sites, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources).
365. Id., art 13, para. 7.
366. For example, the United States has invited NGO representatives to join the U.S.
delegation at several meetings of the OECD Joint Trade and Environment Experts Group.
367. See, e.g., Climate Change Treaty, supra note 26, art. 7, § 6; Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 349, art. 23, § 5.
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has properly been identified as a particularly effective type of power.3 61
Developed nations have effectively focused international attention on
issues that affect them most directly, while Southern tier nations have had
less success in focusing attention on environmental problems most closely
associated with development.369 Consideration of a wider set of issues can
preempt charges that the institution reflects the international environmen-
tal agenda of the developed nations.
Discussions and deliberations must likewise be open, rather than
secret. Existing trade-environment dispute resolution bodies are woefully
inadequate in this respect. As outlined above, the GATT uses a secret and
closed dispute resolution process with no opportunity for direct public
participation at any stage of the process. NAFTA reproduces this closed
dispute resolution system. Although ICJ proceedings are generally
open,37 no mechanism for direct public participation in international
adjudications is provided.37' In contrast, the institution should develop
mechanisms to ensure public participation in and access to its proceed-
ings.
D. The Tools Necessary to Create a
"Culture of Compliance"372
The use of fair and open processes by themselves will not always be
sufficient to persuade a nation to comply with a decision reached by an
international institution. To be effective, an international institution that
attempts to resolve interstate conflicts must be able to encourage com-
pliance with the decisions it reaches. However, the international commu-
nity lacks the familiar domestic enforcement mechanisms that help to
ensure compliance. There is neither an international "sheriff' nor any
possibility of sending recalcitrant States to a "world jail." The institution
that considers trade-environment disputes must possess tools to induce,
rather than coerce, compliance with its decisions.
368. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 2, at 37 (citing STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A
RADICAL APPROACH (1974)).
369. Id.
370. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 215, art. 46. Under this provision, the parties can demand
that the public not be admitted to a hearing. It appears that the Court has held parts of hearings
in closed sessions on two occasions. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 129
(1983).
371. Of course, the public can participate indirectly through scholarly and journalistic
analysis of these institutions and their decisions.
372. This term is borrowed from Louis Henkin. See Louis Henkin, International Law:
Politics, Values and Functions-General Course on Public International Law, in 216 RECUEIL
DES COURS, vol. IV, 9, 67 (1989).
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In addition to broad membership and widespread participation,
international environmental institutions have developed other important
compliance tools.373 One of the most frequently used tools involves
reporting and monitoring requirements.374 This tool involves periodic
reports generated by the parties in addition to observation and inspection
by the international community. The creation and dissemination of
information tends to deter and to correct violations by providing a base
for political mobilization against the offending nation.375 Reporting
requirements are particularly important in ensuring that activities affecting
global commons resources receive adequate international scrutiny.376
In addition, positive incentives to encourage compliance are essential.
These incentives may be especially important to developing nations,
which are frequently unwilling or unable to absorb the short term costs
imposed by costly pollution control regulations or technologies without
373. There is a rapidly expanding literature on compliance in international environmental
regimes. See, e.g., J.H. Ausubel & D.G. Victor, Verification of International Environmental
Agreements, 17 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 1 (1992); RONALD B. MITCHELL, FROM PAPER
TO PRACTICE: IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY COMPLIANCE (1992); GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS (Paul C. Stern et al. eds., 1992);
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993); Karmen
Sachariew, Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards: Reflec-
tions on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 31 (1992). See also
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 1971).
374. These tools are, of course, used in other international legal contexts as well. For the
use of reporting and monitoring requirements in the international human rights context, see, for
example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, art. 40, para. 1 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (member states to submit reports on
measures adopted to comply with the Covenant); Fischer, International Reporting Procedures,
in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 180 (H. Hannum ed., 1984).
375. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State
Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 311 (1991). This mobilization occurs
at several levels. Parties are regularly called upon to explain and justify apparent departures
from international norms in international institutions. "To remain a member of the club, states
must be prepared to justify their activities in terms of norms that they themselves have
previously accepted and may need to apply against others in the future." Id. at 323.
Moreover, the creation and dissemination of information may also help generate pressure
for compliance at the national level. For example, such information can be used by domestic
political factions in their efforts to shape political debates. It can also be utilized by bureaucrats
in intergovernmental policy debates. Id. at 325-26. See also UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: STRENGTHENING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 5-7 (1992) (political support for the
implementation of agreements strengthened by public availability of information).
Of course, parties do not always comply with reporting requirements. For example, only
about sixty percent of the parties to the London Convention comply with the reporting
obligations imposed by that treaty, and only 38% of the industrialized nations and 19% of the
developing nations that are parties to C.I.T.E.S. submitted 1989 annual reports. 2 AGENDA 21,
supra note 93, at 752.
376. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 3, at 165.
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international assistance in these areas. These incentives often involve
preferential access to funding sources, goods, markets, and technology.
The Montreal Protocol, and its subsequent amendments, provide an
example of how such incentives can be used. Pursuant to this treaty, a
Multilateral Fund has been created to help developing nations meet the
incremental costs of complying with the treaty's requirement to reduce
the use of ozone depleting substances.377 Thus, for example, China was
recently awarded a grant totaling U.S. $6.92 million from the Multilateral
Fund to finance the introduction of new technologies that use substitutes
for ozone depleting substances.378
Similarly, the Montreal Protocol signatories attempt to encourage
otherwise reluctant states to join the treaty regime by facilitating the
transfer of technology among parties.379 The treaty calls for the "expedi-
tious" transfer of "the best available, environmentally safe substitutes [for
ozone depleting substances] and related technologies" to developing
nations that join the treaty.38° Such transfers are to occur under "fair and
most favorable conditions. 38' Conversely, parties to the treaty are
discouraged from exporting to nonparties technology for producing or
utilizing ozone depleting substances.382
377. The promises of financial assistance in the Montreal Protocol, supra note 26, art. 5,
were concretized in the London Amendments. London Amendments, supra note 26, annex II.
The initial capital of the fund is to be $160 million over the years 1991-93. This amount is to
be increased to $240 million if additional developing nations become parties to the Montreal
Protocol. Contributions are to be made in accordance with a U.N. assessment scale. Id. art. 10,
para. 6 (as amended).
In particular, the fund is available for parties that reduce their use of ozone depleting
substances according to the reduction timetable applicable to developed nations, rather than
under the slower phase out schedule applicable to developing nations. Id.
378. Nation to Receive $6.92 Million to Address Ozone-Depleting Substances, Int'l Envtl.
Daily (BNA) (Dec. 15, 1993). This grant is the largest awarded to date by the Fund. Id.
Special funds have also been established in the Convention concerning the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, supra note 363; the Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11,084,
996 U.N.T.S. 245; the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
June 23, 1979, reprinted in 19 I.LM. 11 (1980); and the International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources, Res. 8/83, U.N. FAO, 22d Sess., Annex, Part II, U.N. Doc. C/83/REP
(1983). These funds are generally aimed at helping developing nations fulfill their commitments
under the treaty and to participate fully in treaty meetings.
379. Provisions regarding technology transfer are important as "[t]echnological innovation
and diffusion will be critical determinants of the pace andcharacter of future economic growth
and environmental management." Ministerial Statement, OECD Meeting of Ministers of
Environment and Development, December 2-3, 1991 (quoted in 2 AGENDA 21, supra note 93,
at 680-81). On access to technology, see generally Peter Lawrence, Technology Transfer Funds
and the Law: Recent Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, 4 J. ENVTL. L. 15 (1992); Gordon J. McDonald, Technology Transfer: the
Climate Change Challenge, 1 J. ENV'T & DEV. 1 (1992).
380. London Amendments, supra note 26, art. 10A (as amended).
381. Id.
382. Montreal Protocol, supra note 26, art. 4, para. 5.
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Finally, this regime uses restrictions on international trade to encour-
age nations to join the treaty. For example, the treaty severely restricts
trade in certain ozone depleting chemicals with nonparty states.383 Of
course, as outlined above, such trade restrictions are vulnerable to
challenge under international trade law as impermissible nontariff barriers
to trade.
Incentives such as these enable and encourage developing states to
join particular environmental regimes and to engage in environmentally
sound activities. These or similar incentives will be necessary to encour-
age developing nations to raise trade-environment conflicts in a forum
other than the GATT.
E. The Protection of Broader International Interests
in the Global Environment
Given the shared interest in a robust global ecosystem, the institution
ought to do more than simply avoid or adjust differences between
particular nations. It should also have, as a central part of its mission, the
promotion of outcomes and policies that protect the interests of the
international community as a whole.384
To facilitate such outcomes, the institution should permit any member
to make representations regarding any other nation's trade-environment
activities. There should be no requirement that the complaining nation be
uniquely affected. In this respect, the institution would be following a
practice developed by the parties to the Montreal Protocol, which permits
any party to raise issues of possible noncompliance by any other party,
without any requirement of a specialized showing of injury.
385
When considered by the institution proposed here, particular disputes
are not simply occasions for choosing between the trade or environmental
policies of one or another nation. Rather, the disputes present opportuni-
ties to develop, elaborate, and implement global environmental policy.
They are opportunities to articulate common goals, principles, and norms.
Ideally, they present occasions to serve the common good.
383. Id. art. 2. To encourage even nonparties to comply with the treaty, the ban on imports
from nonparties does not apply if the nonparty is in compliance with the control requirements
applicable to member states. Id. art. 4, para. 8.
384. See, e.g., Bilder, Settlement of Disputes, supra note 222, at 162; BIRNIE & BOYLE,
supra note 3, at 546-47 (advocating that international environmental institutions act as
environmental trustees).
385. See also ILO Constitution, Oct. 9, 1946, art. 25, para. 1, 62 Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No.
1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 (state need not show harm to itself or its nationals to file a complaint
against another member for failure to secure effective observance of a labor convention that
both have ratified).
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Moreover, in contrast to a rule-oriented approach, the negotiation-
centered approach outlined above offers the flexibility to respond to new
information and changing circumstances.386 It also permits the use of
"asymmetrical standards," the imposition of differential obligations, and
the use of selective incentives. Although it may seem difficult at first
blush to reconcile selective incentives with the fundamental international
legal doctrine of the sovereign equality of states,387 they are not
uncommon in the international environmental area.388 Nations make
"different contributions to global environmental degradation," and each
nation possesses different abilities to address such degradation; thus,
"States have common but differentiated responsibilities." '389 In practice
this means, as was affirmed at the Earth Summit, that "[t]he special
situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least devel-
oped and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special
priority. ' 39
Differential standards may be criticized as loopholes designed to
appease particular nations or special interests. However, without selective
incentives, a regime may either lose important nations or coalesce around
a lower level of collective agreement. "Paradoxically, therefore, [differen-
386. The "capacity to respond to frequent and rapid change ... [is] critical to successful
international management." Sand, supra note 326, at 6.
387. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 ("This Organization is based on the principle
of sovereign equality of all its Members."); Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970) ("All states enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties
and are equal members of the international community .... States are juridically equal."). This
principle, of course, predates the U.N. Charter. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122
(1825) ("No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect
equality of nations .... ") (Marshall, C.J.). Good historical accounts of the development of this
principle are found in P.H. KOoIiMANS, THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEGAL EQUALITY OF STATES
(1964); EDWIN DEW. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1920);
and JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE EQUALITY OF STATES: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LAW
(1923).
388. The Montreal Protocol contains a number of asymmetrical standards. Developing
nations were permitted to postpone compliance with the treaty's production and consumption
levels for ten years. Montreal Protocol, supra note 26, art. 5. The Soviet Union was granted
"grandfather rights" for factories under construction at the time the treaty was negotiated. Id.,
art. 2, para. 6. The member states of the EC were also permitted to aggregate their national
consumption limits. Id., art 2, para. 8.
389. Rio Declaration, supra note 43, prin. 7. See also Climate Change Convention, supra
note 26, art. 3, para. I & art. 4, para. I (noting common but differentiated responsibilities of
nations in context of climate change).
390. Rio Declaration, supra note 43, prin. 6. See also Climate Change Convention, supra
note 26, art. 3, para. 2 (noting "specific needs and special circumstances of developing country
Parties"); Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 349, art. 20, para. 5 (requiring parties
to "take full account of the specific needs and special situation of least developed countries"
regarding funding and technology transfer).
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tial standards] can serve to upgrade the overall standard of obligations in
an agreement - above the predictable [lowest] common denominator,
that is." '391 The use of selective incentives and differential standards, like
the other tools described above to encourage compliance, operate as
"techniques that allow leeway to expediency without abandoning princi-
ple.
392
The proposal set out above may generate a number of criticisms. For
example, some may object to this proposal because it relies upon a
nonbinding mechanism to resolve trade-environment conflicts. The
argument is that the absence of a mechanism to force the "losing" party
in a conflict to comply with the "decision" effectively renders any
decision reached "unenforceable."
This argument, of course, can be directed against the use of trade or
adjudicatory bodies for trade-environment conflicts.393 Dispute resolution
in both sorts of institutions is substantially dependent upon the consent
of states concerned. Absent consent, adjudicatory bodies do not even
possess jurisdiction to hear a dispute. Under current GATT practice,
dispute resolution panel reports are adopted by the GATT Council by
consensus. 394 Until adopted by the GATT Council, a report is of no legal
force. Thus, the practice of adaptation by consensus permits the party
against whom the GATT panel has found to block the report from having
any legal force.
More importantly, a criticism based upon the consensual nature of the
proposed forum and nonenforceability of its decisions proves too much.
"[A]t some level all participation in any international organization is
voluntary." 395 Unlike domestic law, international law "is applied, for the
most part, through a variety of informal channels, and rarely benefits
from formal appraisal by a court or tribunal., 396 For this reason, in the
international system, "negotiation supported by various forms of third
party intervention or mediation is the pervasive method for securing
391. Peter H. Sand, International Cooperation: The Environmental Experience, in
PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 323, at 236, 242.
392. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 71 (2d ed. 1986).
393. Indeed, the unenforceability argument may have even a wider application. For a
provocative argument that much domestic law is unenforceable, see Roger Fisher, Bringing Law
to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1961).
394. The new WTO will not follow this practice. See GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, supra note 83.
395. STONE, supra note 29, at 205.
396. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the
Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1984).
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compliance regardless of the substantive area of regulation." '397 Notwith-
standing this voluntary aspect of the international legal system, and the
absence of an effective coercive enforcement structure, the system is
marked by a high degree of state compliance with legal norms.9 '
In the international environmental area in particular, the development
of the law rarely results from binding adjudication or declarations of
rules. Rather, "the evolution of international law in the field of envi-
ronment and sustainable development is influenced by mechanisms other
than formal legal agreements or instruments. '399 A good example is the
longstanding use of nonbinding, bilateral commissions to successfully
resolve transboundary pollution problems between the United States and
Canada.4°°
Thus, the appropriate search should be for a nonbinding forum and
process that is most likely to be effective, rather than for an institution
empowered to coerce compliance with binding determinations. The
approach outlined above offers the opportunity to organize and thereby
strengthen the noncoercive mechanisms that encourage recalcitrant nations
to conduct their affairs in an environmentally sensitive manner.
A related series of criticisms might suggest that this proposal is
misguided because it moves away from a "rule-based" resolution of trade-
environment conflicts in favor of a "power-based" determination of these
issues. While urging the creation of a new institution in the guise of
advancing international environmental law, in fact this proposal would
promote a turn away from law towards politics.4°' By relying on an
397. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 375, at 313.
398. HENKIN, supra note 229, at 47 ("almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time"). The generally high
level of compliance with international law is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., HENRY
WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE
SCIENCE iii-iv (1st ed. 1836) (early international law treatise noting general observance of
international legal norms).
399. 2 AGENDA 21, supra note 93, at 758.
400. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 255; Edith Brown Weiss, New Directions for the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375 (1989); Richard B. Bilder,
Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United States-Canadian Environmental
Cooperation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 469 (1972).
401. There is substantial literature on the relative merits of "rule-based" legalistic dispute
resolution mechanisms and more flexible, nonadjudicatory mechanisms in the trade area. See,
e.g., JACKSON, supra note 6, at 85-88 (contrasting "rule-oriented" and "power-oriented"
approaches); OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM 61-64 (1985); Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1299-1300, 1304 (1971); Phillip R.
Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1985)
(legalist v. pragmatist approaches); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11
FORDHAM INT'L L.J..51, 69-78 (1987) (distinguishing between "adjudication" and
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essentially political process, this proposal will dilute the force of the legal
standards that do exist. 4°2 In addition, the use of a politicized process runs
the risk of legitimizing practices that would be otherwise unacceptable
from an environmental viewpoint.
At one level, this objection may rest on an overly constrained under-
standing of "international law." Often, where it exists, international law
is not recognized. As Professor Henkin explained, international law
includes the structure of [international] society, its institutions, forms
and procedures for daily activity, the assumptions on which the
society is founded and the concepts which permeate it, the status,
rights, responsibilities, obligations of the nations which comprise
that society, the various relations between them, and the effects of
those relations.
404
On a deeper level, this objection focuses on the complex interrela-
tionships of international law, institutions, and politics. Although an
extended discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, 5
there is no doubt that nonbinding deliberations of multilateral forums, like
those urged above, "often play a central role in the creation and shaping
of contemporary international law." 4°6 This process is particularly
pronounced in the international environmental field. 4 7
Moreover, one significant role international institutions play is "to
clear the channels of political change., 40 ' The institution urged here
"negotiation"). A recent reconceptualization of this debate is found in Kenneth W. Abbott, The
Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-Interests System of Justice, I
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111 (1992); Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The
Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31 (1992).
402. Boyle, supra note 328, at 230.
403. Id.
404. HENKIN, supra note 229, at 14.
405. An extremely textured interpretation of recent literature addressing this relationship
is found in Ann-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory:
A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
406. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543
(1993) (describing how reports, proposals, and resolutions of specialized international bodies
and multilateral diplomatic conferences contribute to development of international law). Others
have commented on the ability of multilateral fora to advance the international lawmaking
process. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 245, at 127-30, 132; Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga,
Custom, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING I (Antonio Cassese &
Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 1988); Rosalyn Higgins, The Role of Resolutions of International
Organizations in the Process of Creating Norms of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21 (W.E. Butler ed. 1987).
407. Charney, supra note 406, at 549.
408. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 105 (1980). This proposition is exten-
sively developed in Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Polyarchy and Distrust (arguing that, while
countermajoritarian, adjudicative bodies play this role in the U.S. domestic political system,
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would play this role in the trade-environment field. This explains, in part,
the stress above on open and participatory processes in the new institu-
tion. Transparent processes for setting agendas and reaching decisions
make possible the ability to provide a forum for advancing "an agenda
for change" in the international environmental field.4°9
Thus, the institution will not produce a static body of absolute rules
to govern trade-environment conflicts. Rather, it should generate an
evolving, growing customary law grounded in the claims, practices, and
expectations of the international community. One should expect this law
to change in response to changing environmental conditions, new scien-
tific knowledge and technological advances, and emerging economic,
social, and political interests.
If structured as suggested above, the institution's deliberations will play
an important legitimizing function. Decisions of this sort by international
bodies "tend to have a self-enabling, self-licensing, or self-authorizing
power for states supporting them. Formal limitations on the competence
of representative [institutions] are not an effective restraint in the face of
a willful majority., 410 Thus, deliberations by the institution regarding
particular trade-environment conflicts will create political space within
which nations can act. The institutional framework proposed above is
specifically designed to facilitate such action; to "empower governments
rather than shackling them. 4 1
Finally, critics may argue that any proposal for a new international
environmental institution is politically unrealistic. Although a general
reluctance to form new international bodies is often articulated,412 inter-
national institutions continue to proliferate, particularly in the interna-
tional environmental area.413 Although this is a relatively new field,
already more than forty international environmental treaties create new
majoritarian, political bodies must play this role in the international system) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with MICH. J. INT'L L.).
409. Through established leadership roles, institutions can give proponents of action a
disproportionate influence that they would otherwise lack. Through its ability to link issues, the
institution can increase the possibility of action. See supra text accompanying notes 368 to 383.
410. Gidon Gottlieb, Global Bargaining: The Legal and Diplomatic Framework, in LAW
MAKING IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 109, 123 (Nicholas G. Onuf ed., 1982).
411. ROBERTO. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 13 (1984).
412. See, e.g., Institutional Proposals, Report of the Secretary-General of the Conference,
paras. 3-9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/102, reprinted in 2 AGENDA 21, supra note 93, at 689,
689-92 (UNCED preparatory report noting objections of different nations to formation of new
global institution to address environmental and developmental issues).
413. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/188, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/47/188 (1992)
(forming an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, open to all States that are members of
the United Nations, for the elaboration of an international convention to combat desertification).
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international bodies or entrust existing ones with secretarial review or
coordination functions.414 The preparations for and results of the recent
Earth Summit surely demonstrate that the international community
continues to create new bodies when convinced that they are needed.
This article is, in part, an effort to demonstrate that such a need exists
in the trade-environment field. It has tried to demonstrate that the status
quo, namely reliance on trade bodies, is deeply problematic and that the
use of adjudicatory bodies is both unlikely and undesirable. This analysis,
if accurate, surely leads to the conclusion that there is a need for new
institutional structures in this area.415
The international community has already indicated that it recognizes
this need and appears to be moving towards a consensus for change in the
directions urged above. Indeed, the Earth Summit itself can be seen as a
recognition of the need to create new fora for the discussion and resolu-
tion of international environmental issues. At that meeting, the interna-
tional community declared that "[iun order to meet the challenges of
environment and development, States have decided to establish a new
global partnership.' '416 This partnership rests upon the recognition that
[a] sound environment ... provides the ecological and other re-
sources needed to sustain growth and underpin a continuing
expansion of trade. An open, multilateral trading system, supported
by the adoption of sound environmental policies, would have a posi-
tive impact on the environment and contribute to sustainable devel-
opment .... The challenge is to ensure that trade and environment
policies are consistent and reinforce the process of sustainable
development." 7
Significantly, nations are experimenting with a variety of
nonadjudicatory, nonbinding dispute resolution procedures in the inter-
national environmental field. The first major multilateral institution
formed since the end of the Cold War, the Commission on Sustainable
Development, represents an important development toward the sort of
institution urged above.418 Significant political momentum for more action
414. Sachariew, supra note 373.
415. Others have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Barton & Carter, supra note 233, at
553 ("There is a pressing need for new international organizational machinery in the environ-
mental area.").
416. 1 AGENDA 21, supra note 337, para. 2(1).
417. Id., paras. 2.19-2.20.
418. The newly formed Commission is designed to, inter alia, monitor progress related
to the integration of environmental and developmental goals throughout the U.N. system;
review the progress of nations in the implementation of the commitments contained in Agenda
21; and review progress in the implementation of international environmental treaties. G.A. Res.
47/191, U.N. GAOR, i AGENDA 21, supra note 337, para. 38(13).
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calls for action along these lines. In particular, there is substantial politi-
cal pressure for the United Nations to form a new global environmental
entity to coincide with the U.N.'s upcoming fiftieth anniversary. Forma-
tion of the body urged above would represent a timely and significant
step in the progressive realization of a global partnership for sustainable
development.
CONCLUSION
Trade-environment conflicts are currently addressed in trade institu-
tions. This article has attempted to demonstrate why these bodies are
incapable of providing a balanced response to the competing interests at
stake in such conflicts. Although many have urged that such issues be
resolved by adjudicatory bodies such as the International Court of Justice,
such disputes possess a variety of features that render them particularly
ill-suited for adjudication. For these reasons, a different institutional
approach is needed. This article is an attempt to provoke a discussion
regarding the type of approach that would be appropriate and to set forth
one possible approach that might profitably be used.
The advantage of the framework urged above is that, unlike present
methods of resolving such conflicts, it is designed to facilitate the
identification and balancing of the economic and ecological interests
implicated in trade-environment conflicts. Compared to the status quo, or
to the potential adjudication of trade-environment conflicts, the adoption
of this proposal would be a major advance. It is flexible enough to evolve
over time in response to changing needs and circumstances. By attempt-
ing to build consensus at the intersection of the trade-environment and
developmental areas, it can address the pressing problems of today and
begin a global dialogue on the environmental challenges of the years
ahead.
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